United States v. Williams

Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 17, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-1510

KYLEAR WILLIAMS,

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:24-CR-00112-PAB-1) _________________________________

Gail K. Johnson of Johnson & Klein, PLLC, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant- Appellant.

J. Bishop Grewell, Assistant United States Attorney (Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellee. _________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

We must decide whether the Fourth Amendment permitted a protective

sweep of a car after the driver was arrested and handcuffed. Everyone agrees

that the police developed reasonable suspicion that the driver was armed and  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 2

dangerous. But with the arrest, any safety risks that the driver posed to the

officers ended. Still, the police conducted a protective sweep of the driver’s

area rather than let the passenger-owner leave it legally parked or drive it away.

Within seconds of beginning the sweep, officers recovered from under the

driver’s seat a loaded handgun and a magazine containing ammunition.

A federal grand jury indicted the driver for possessing ammunition after a

felony conviction. In response to the driver’s motion to suppress the firearm

and ammunition, the government argued that the protective sweep was

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. It contended that objectively

reasonable officers would have suspected that the passenger, too, was armed

and dangerous. To support this view, the government projected the driver’s

alarming criminal history and gang ties to the passenger. It argued that prudent

officers would reasonably suspect a passenger-girlfriend of a gang-associated

boyfriend as a threat to access a hidden weapon from inside the car and to use it

in a quixotic attempt to free him from four alert, armed officers.

The district court approved the protective sweep and denied the

suppression motion. Agreeing with the government, the court ruled that the

officers had reasonable suspicion that the girlfriend-passenger was armed and

dangerous. It relied solely on her “romantic relationship” with the boyfriend-

driver. But this amounts to a criminality-by-association test, when the

governing test instead requires that we consider the totality of circumstances.

The circumstances of this passenger include these: she produced a valid

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driver’s license, current registration, and proof of insurance for her car; she

was polite, calm, and cooperative throughout the stop; and she committed no

crime and was not suspected of being involved in any. We conclude that the

protective search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. We reverse.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

At 8:24 p.m. on January 20, 2024, Kylear Williams and his girlfriend,

Ajanaya Richardson, were riding in her Chevy Impala down Colfax Avenue in

Denver. Ms. Richardson had dropped off her daughter with her sister for the

night, and she and Williams were within a block of arriving back at his house,

which he shared with his father. Two Denver police officers on patrol

(members of the Special Operations Response Team)—Corporal Zachary

Moldenhauer and Officer Emmet Hurd—noticed that the Impala was missing its

front license plate. They kept their gaze on the Impala and saw the driver fail to

use his turn signal. With flashing overhead lights, they signaled for the Impala

to pull over. The driver, Williams, immediately did so. The officers watched

the Impala’s two occupants for furtive movements and saw none.

After Williams pulled over, but before the officers approached the Impala

on foot, Williams telephoned his father at their house across the street. As seen

on the video, his father and two others came outside and watched the stop from

the driveway.

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Williams’s house is on a residential street that lies within the East Colfax

Corridor of northeast Denver. Broadly speaking, the police consider this

corridor a high-crime area. The two officers had each worked in this area for

years. According to them, some of this corridor amounts to an “open-air drug

market” where “[t]he sale and distribution of narcotics is very prevalent.” R. at

69. The officers describe it as having “a lot of violent crimes, shootings,

stabbings, homicides, and a lot of weapons-related offenses.” Id. Carjackings

and gang activity abound.

Before the cars rolled to a stop, Cpl. Moldenhauer called in the Impala’s

license plate. He learned that the car was registered to a woman named Ajanaya

Richardson. About twenty seconds after the cars stopped, Cpl. Moldenhauer

walked to the driver’s window, and Officer Hurd walked to the passenger

window.

A. Williams’s Car Window

By the time Cpl. Moldenhauer reached the driver’s door, Williams had

rolled down his window and placed his hands on the steering wheel. Cpl.

Moldenhauer asked, “What’s going on, man?” Williams’s response is inaudible

on the video recording, but Cpl. Moldenhauer replied, “Good, how are you?”

Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “Hey, you got your license, registration, insurance?”

Williams responded that “it’s her car.” Cpl. Moldenhauer then asked for

Williams’s identification.

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As Williams reached inside his sweatpants pocket for his wallet, Cpl.

Moldenhauer asked, “What you guys up to tonight?” Williams removed his

Colorado identification from his wallet and handed it to Cpl. Moldenhauer. Cpl.

Moldenhauer said, “You said it’s her car?” Williams said, “Yeah.” After

examining the ID, Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “Kylear, where you stay at, man?”

Williams responded, “Uh, right here,” gesturing toward the other side of the

street.

Cpl. Moldenhauer noticed that the ID listed Williams’s address as that of

a Denver detention facility. Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “Get your ID when you

were locked up, man?” Williams responded, “Yeah.” Cpl. Moldenhauer asked

when Williams had been released, and Williams said about three months ago.

Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “What were you in for?” and Williams said,

“Colorado Organized Crime Act.” Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “Who do you roll

with?” Williams said, “Park Hill.” Cpl. Moldenhauer clarified, “Park Hill

Bloods?” and Williams said, “Yeah.” Then Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “When’d

you get wrapped up in that?” Williams said, “Like 2018,” adding that he was in

prison “almost six years.”

Cpl. Moldenhauer remarked, “You’ve been doing good,” and Williams

perked up and said, “Yeah I just seen my PO the other day.” Cpl. Moldenhauer

shined the flashlight on Williams’s arm tattoo and asked whether it was a

known Park Hill tattoo. Williams said, “Yeah.”

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Staying on the gang subject, Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “You seen

anybody since you been out from Park Hill?” Williams said, “Nah, I’ve just

been trying to just stay out the way. I’ve just been working and everything.”

Cpl. Moldenhauer asked, “You done with that lifestyle or are you still rolling

with it? Never-get-out type thing?” Williams said, “Yeah, kinda but, you know,

I can still like be me and love where I’m from but from a distance.” Williams

declared gang life too “stressful.”

At that moment, Ms. Richardson found the registration and proof of

insurance and handed the two documents to Officer Hurd. After Officer Hurd

signaled to Cpl. Moldenhauer that he had obtained them, Cpl. Moldenhauer

said, “Be right back with you, man.” The two officers returned to the patrol car.

They left Williams and Ms. Richardson sitting in the Impala.

B. Ms. Richardson’s Car Window

Meanwhile, when Officer Hurd arrived at Ms. Richardson’s car window,

she had her valid driver’s license in hand. She was sorting through papers in

the glove box and center console for the car’s registration and proof of

insurance. Having difficulty finding them, Ms. Richardson apologized, and the

officer responded, “You’re fine.” As Officer Hurd waited the two minutes or so

it took her to locate them, he shined his flashlight through the windshield and

passenger window into the car’s interior—including into the opened glove box

and toward the center console, as well as into the back-seat area.

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As Ms. Richardson continued sorting through the loose papers, Officer

Hurd asked her, “Where you guys coming from this evening?” She answered

that she had just dropped her daughter off for the night. After finding the

requested documents and handing them to Officer Hurd, Ms. Richardson asked,

“How are you?” and Officer Hurd responded, “I’m good how are you?” Ms.

Richardson replied, “Doing well, thank you.” And Officer Hurd responded,

“That’s good.”

Officer Hurd testified that at some point Ms. Richardson told him that

she was dating Williams. 1 The officers later testified that Ms. Richardson was

cooperative, polite, and pleasant, willing to “engage[] in small talk.” They also

testified that Williams cooperated throughout the stop.

C. Back in the Patrol Car

When back in the patrol car, Officer Hurd checked for active warrants

and criminal history for Williams and Ms. Richardson. He learned that

Williams had no valid driver’s license, had two active municipal-court arrest

warrants, had a history of charges involving violence and weapons, and had ties

to the Crenshaw Mafia Bloods. In contrast, the officers learned that Ms.

Richardson had a valid driver’s license and no arrest warrants.

1 After listening to the video recordings multiple times, we have been unable to hear Ms. Richardson mention that she and Williams were dating. Because the district court’s order is built on that premise, it’s an important fact. But Williams does not contest that this happened, so we accept it for this appeal. 7  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 8

D. The Arrest, Detention, and Protective Sweep

After learning about Williams’s history, the officers called for backup.

About two minutes later, Officers Danielson and Gergits arrived. Cpl.

Moldenhauer and Officer Hurd went to the driver’s side window and had

Williams exit the car. They immediately handcuffed and arrested him on the

municipal warrants. They then moved him about thirty feet away near the patrol

car and patted him down.

After Williams was handcuffed and led away from the Impala, Officer

Danielson spoke to Ms. Richardson from the passenger door. He told her that

she was “not in any trouble or nothing” and asked her to “hop out for me.” She

said “yes” and did so.

Ms. Richardson was wearing a mostly snug black sweatshirt and tight

jeans. Officer Williamson had Ms. Richardson place her hands on top of the

car, and he patted her down for thirteen seconds. Then he directed her to the

back of the Impala and faced her away from it. She remained fully compliant

and silent. The officers had already positioned Williams facing the patrol car

with his back to Ms. Richardson. Ms. Richardson did not communicate with

Williams in any fashion after the officers removed him from the Impala. In the

videos, both Ms. Richardson and Williams are silent, docile, and compliant.

Cpl. Moldenhauer didn’t immediately take Williams to the police station.

Instead, he stayed to conduct a “protective sweep” of Ms. Richardson’s car.

Within seconds, he saw a handgun and magazine lying about halfway under the

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driver’s seat. The handgun was loaded, lacked a serial number (a “Ghost gun”),

and bore a “Park Hill Center” stamp or sticker. The magazine held ammunition.

Cpl. Moldenhauer immediately signaled for Officer Gergits to handcuff

Ms. Richardson. Cpl. Moldenhauer testified that the handcuffing was to

eliminate any chance Ms. Richardson might try to access the handgun or the car

while the officers fully searched it and processed Williams.

As the officers turned Ms. Richardson toward the Impala and began

handcuffing her, she calmly asked, “May I ask why I’m being detained?” Cpl.

Moldenhauer replied, “Yeah, I’ll tell you here in a second, ok?” He then faced

Ms. Richardson away from her car again, where she remained handcuffed and

silent for several minutes until the video ends. By the time Ms. Richardson was

handcuffed, Williams was on his way to the back seat of the patrol car. The

four officers were either searching the Impala or lingering near it. One kept

close watch on Ms. Richardson the whole time.

During the ensuing full search of the car, Cpl. Moldenhauer told another

officer, “He said he lives right there.” An officer then spoke to the people

standing across the street, saying, “How’s it going guys?” Someone responded,

“all right.” The officer asked, “Are you related to Mr. Williams?” After they

responded yes, the officer replied, “All right, I’ll be right over to talk to you,

ok?” Soon after, Officer Hurd spent about a minute talking to the Williams

family members in their driveway.

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About then, Officer Gergits moved Ms. Richardson to the front of the

patrol car, this time facing the Impala. Cpl. Moldenhauer opened the Impala’s

trunk and began searching its contents. It was jam-packed with a child’s car

seat, blankets, and clothing. 2

After the protective sweep and full search, an officer told Ms. Richardson

that she would be able to take control of her car. But Officer Danielson had

already called for a tow truck. So after Cpl. Moldenhauer and Officer Hurd left

with Williams, Officers Danielson and Gergits waited for the tow truck. Ms.

Richardson joined Williams’ family members across the street. Ms. Richardson

incurred a $3,000 lot-storage bill and spent a “long month” without her car. She

was never ticketed for a license-plate violation if one even occurred.

II. Procedural History

A federal grand jury in Colorado charged Williams with being a felon in

possession of ammunition. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Williams

moved to suppress evidence of the firearm and ammunition. He argued that the

officers had lacked reasonable suspicion that Ms. Richardson was armed and

dangerous, as needed to justify a protective search of the car. After a hearing,

the district court denied the suppression motion.

Officer Hurd testified that he read Ms. Richardson a Miranda warning, 2

but the video cuts off before that occurred. After waiving her rights, she told him that she had known Williams for about eight years and had not ever seen or heard about the handgun. After the officers found his firearm, Williams told them that Ms. Richardson had not known of the firearm. 10  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 11

Williams pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the court’s order

denying suppression. The court sentenced him to sixty-three months’

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Williams appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we

examine the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Canada, 76 F.4th

1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 2023). We view all facts in the light most favorable to

the government and accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they are

clearly erroneous. United States v. Pena, 115 F.4th 1254, 1258–59 (10th Cir.

2024).

We review de novo the question of reasonableness under the Fourth

Amendment. United States v. Johnson, 43 F.4th 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2022). In

doing so, we “defer to the ability of a trained law enforcement officer to

distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307

(citation omitted). The government bears the burden of proving reasonable

suspicion, which is not an onerous one. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165,

1174 (10th Cir. 2022).

DISCUSSION

This appeal raises a question about the reasonableness of detaining a

passenger away from her car while the police conduct a protective sweep of the

driver’s area. Here, the officers could conduct a protective sweep of Ms.

Richardson’s car only if they had reasonable suspicion that she was armed and

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dangerous. The test is an objective one. The district court ruled that Ms.

Richardson’s dating relationship with a gang-associated man like Williams

supplied the required reasonable suspicion. After considering the totality of

circumstances, we disagree.

I. The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches of “persons,

houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A “vehicle is an ‘effect’

protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307 (quoting Byrd

v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 403 (2018)).

Courts recognize that the government has a “legitimate and weighty”

interest in officer safety. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356

(2015) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1983)).

Because traffic stops are inherently dangerous, police can order a driver and

passengers out of an automobile during a stop. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519

U.S. 408, 415 (1997). At the same time, courts do not ignore “the

countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional

rights fully protected.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 (2009).

Generally, warrantless searches are unreasonable, but this rule has

several exceptions. One such exception, and the one at issue here, allows

officers to perform protective sweeps of “areas in which a weapon may be

placed or hidden” if the police reasonably suspect that “a suspect poses a

danger and may gain immediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307. 12  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 13

In that instance, the police can sweep areas of the automobile from which the

returning occupant could immediately access a weapon. See Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1983) (comparing a protective sweep in this circumstance

to a Terry stop because “if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be

permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any

weapons inside”).

II. Analysis

The district court ruled that the protective sweep—occurring after

Williams had been handcuffed, arrested, and moved away to the patrol car—

complied with the Fourth Amendment. It announced what we perceive to be a

per se rule that “when you’re taking the romantic partner of someone away,

there is a potential for violence.” R. at 144. It expanded on this statement as

follows:

[T]he Court finds that a reasonable officer could believe that the fact that Mr. Williams is being arrested and taken away from her, that could motivate a romantic partner and probably particularly a romantic partner of a gang member to believe that she needed to somehow intervene or defend her romantic partner by accessing a weapon that was located in the car.

R. at 150. Later, the court summarized its thoughts this way: “the Court does

not believe that the officers had to conclude through some type of observations

outside her romantic relationship to Mr. Williams that she was in and of herself

a dangerous person.” R. at 154.

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Even if we credited this rationale as viable, which we don’t, we would

notice that the government offered scant evidence about the degree of the

“romantic relationship.” The officers knew that the two were dating and that

Williams had been released just three months earlier from a six-year prison

term.

The government must show that “the police officer possesses a

reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together

with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officers in

believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate

control of the weapons.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 21 (1968)); see also United States v. Raban, 162 F.4th 1223, 1231 (10th

Cir. 2025) (“Protective sweeps ‘exist for officer safety; we do not require

officers to take unnecessary risks.’” (quoting Canada, 76 F.4th at 1309)).

For the “armed” piece, we agree that the officers could reasonably

suspect that Ms. Richardson “may gain immediate access to a weapon” that

Williams might have hidden under the driver’s seat. See Canada, 76 F.4th at

1307. Crediting the importance of officer safety, we agree that the officers

could reasonably infer that Ms. Richardson would have known of any hidden

firearm.

For the “and dangerous” condition, we note that the government did not

even try to show Ms. Richardson’s dangerousness apart from relying on her

dating relationship with Williams. But a dating relationship is just one

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circumstance among a totality of them. See United States v. McGregor, 158

F.4th 1082, 1091–92 (10th Cir. 2025) (explaining that we analyze reasonable

suspicion for a protective sweep under “the totality of the circumstances”).

Among other things, the officers also knew (1) that Ms. Richardson (and

Williams) had been polite and cooperative throughout the stop, (2) that she was

not under the influence of any intoxicants, (3) that she was not acting angry or

upset, (4) that she voluntarily disclosed the dating relationship, (5) that she was

a mother who had just dropped off her daughter at her sister’s for the night,

(6) that Williams had been released from prison three months earlier after being

incarcerated for six years, (7) that she and Williams had just arrived back at his

house, and (8) that she and Williams did not communicate after the officers

removed Williams from the Impala. Nothing about Ms. Richardson during the

stop suggested a person ready to die in a shootout with four officers.

We reject a rule that a woman with a dating partner like Williams is per

se reasonably suspicious for being armed and dangerous. This rule would not

harmonize with Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721 (10th Cir. 2009). There, we

held that “a familial relationship is insufficiently particularized to justify

invading an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 725. We

applied this rule to the defendant’s sister-in-law and parents-in-law, concluding

that “combined with the meager additional facts known to [the officers], [those

family relationships] were insufficient to support a finding of either probable

cause to search the property or reasonable suspicion to detain [the sister-in-law

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at a traffic stop].” Id. And those family relationships were closer than the short

dating relationship known to the officers here.

In addition, we find persuasive United States v. Johnson, 163 F.4th 933

(5th Cir. 2026). There, officers waited for Johnson to leave his house to arrest

him on a warrant for violating his federal supervised-release conditions arising

from drug convictions. Id. at 936. Johnson was a Bloods gang member and was

the primary suspect in an ongoing homicide investigation. Id. at 935–36. He

backed out of his driveway into the street, and the officers stopped the car.

Johnson exited the car. His passenger and live-in girlfriend, Beatrice Simmons,

stayed inside it. Id. at 936.

The officers had information that Simmons had once told officers that

“she was a felon and either on probation or on parole.” 3 Id. at 936. The officers

removed Simmons from the car and stood her in the driveway unhandcuffed. Id.

Johnson told Simmons to return the car to the driveway and advised the officers

that it was her car. Id. The officers ran a protective sweep of the driver’s area.

Id. In the car’s center console, the officers found a loaded handgun with a full

magazine. Id. The officers handcuffed Simmons, who told them that she had not

known of the handgun. Id.

3 The court later noted that the officers “had no more reason to suspect Simmons previously committed tax fraud or perjury than some serious violent offense” and that the officer was “unaware of the timing of Simmons’s conviction.” Johnson, 163 F.4th at 940 n.4. 16  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 17

As here, the boyfriend in Johnson was charged with a federal felon-in-

possession crime and moved to suppress the firearm and ammunition from

evidence. Id. The government argued on officer-safety grounds that the

protective sweep was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 937.

Despite the officers’ information that Simmons might be a felon, and

despite her “romantic” and live-in relationship with Johnson, the Fifth Circuit

held “that [Simmons’s] presence did not justify the warrantless search of

Johnson’s vehicle.” Id. at 935. It did so “[b]ecause the officers observed

nothing to suggest that Simmons was potentially dangerous.” Id. Though

acknowledging “that Simmons’s criminal record and close relationship with

Johnson were properly considered . . . in determining whether Simmons might

have been dangerous,” the court found that information insufficient “without

some fact contemporaneous to or arising out of Johnson’s arrest that suggests

Simmons was potentially dangerous.” Id. at 943. And without such a showing,

the court determined that “the totality of these circumstances could not have

caused [the officer] to reasonably fear for his safety.” Id.

We agree and note that Johnson’s facts presented a stronger case for a

protective sweep than do the facts in our appeal.

Ruling before Johnson was decided, the district court in the present case

commented that the “case law is not particularly well developed” for the issue

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raised in the motion to suppress. 4 R. at 151. The district court noted the unique

question of reasonable suspicion of a passenger not suspected of criminal

activity and asked the parties for any helpful cases. The government argued that

United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2005), “really governs the

analysis of a passenger,” R. at 126, and added that it “d[idn’t] have a case to

cite you to outside of Dennison,” 5 R. at 132.

The district court relied primarily on Dennison to support its ruling, and

the government treats it as its centerpiece on appeal. In this regard, the

government contends that the facts of Williams’s case “mirror those in

Dennison,” Resp. Br. at 8, and it describes the underlying factual situations as

“nearly identical,” 6 id. at 12.

4 The district court—and the government—relied on this statement from Justice Scalia in Gant: “In the no-arrest case, the possibility of access to weapons in the vehicle always exists, since the driver or passenger will be allowed to return to the vehicle when the interrogation is completed.” 556 U.S. at 352 (Scalia, J., concurring). We agree that Long’s protective-sweep exception can apply to passengers, too—but only passengers reasonably suspected of being armed and dangerous. We don’t understand Justice Scalia’s statement to say otherwise. 5 Unlike here, the government in Dennison never argued officer safety based on a reasonable suspicion that Dennison was a danger to immediately access weapons and use them to try to free his passenger, Keith Allen, from police custody. 6 In the district court, the government acknowledged that the relationship between the two men in Dennison involved “perhaps a little more nefarious nature” than the one between Williams and Ms. Richardson. R. at 131. But the government argued that the “inference” that the two men were “engaged in perhaps some additional criminal activity . . . [as] suspected in Dennison” was (footnote continued) 18  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 19

We conclude that Dennison does not justify the district court’s ruling. In

Dennison, an officer on patrol was at an “apartment complex that had a high

incidence of nighttime car theft.” 410 F.3d at 1205. At about 3 a.m., he saw a

gold Ford truck with a “topper” shell parked with its engine and lights turned

off. Id. The officer “pulled up alongside the truck and asked what the two men

[in the truck] were doing.” Id. The men said that they had lost the keys to a

Chevy pickup in a separate parking lot and were awaiting a tow truck. Id. The

parking lot was “an extensive distance away.” Id.

The officer left and circled the apartment complex for about twenty or

thirty seconds but returned to the truck after feeling that “something didn’t

seem right.” Id. at 1206. In that short time, the driver of the Ford truck had

moved it closer to the parking lot supposedly containing the Chevy and now

had its engine running and lights on. Id. The officer got out of his patrol car to

“check and make sure [the Chevy was] their truck.” Id. at 1206.

During this second encounter with the patrol officer, the passenger, Keith

Allen, mentioned that he had been in a “domestic” and was “wanting to get the

Chevy truck before his girlfriend came and damaged it.” Id. This jogged the

officer’s memory of “a recent police bulletin to watch for a gold station wagon

not necessary for reasonable suspicion that a passenger like Ms. Richardson was armed and dangerous. R. at 128. Instead, the government argued that Dennison supported such reasonable suspicion when “there is that common interest that when individuals are traveling, they discuss a [sic] close quarters, if you will, within the passenger compartment of the vehicle.” R. at 126. But as we will explain, we reject that reading of Dennison. 19  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 20

in the vicinity of the apartment complex because the police wanted a driver or

passenger for a domestic violence incident.” Id. Anticipating arresting Allen,

the officer obtained each man’s identification.

After running that information through the system, the officer learned

that Allen had four outstanding arrest warrants, including a felony arrest

warrant for a weapons violation, and that the driver, Dennison, had none. Id.

After backup arrived, the officers arrested Allen and placed him in the patrol

car. Id. Before the protective sweep, they had Dennison exit the truck, patted

him down, and handcuffed him at the back of the truck. Id. He refused to give

consent to search his truck. 7 Id.

During the search, a backup officer found “a loaded shotgun on the back

seat under a blanket.” Id. The initial officer then shined his flashlight into the

topper shell and “saw the vented barrel of a machine gun partially exposed

under a blanket inside the cargo bed.” Id. Soon after, the officers found “a

loaded handgun and drug paraphernalia in the front and back seats.” Id.

After arresting Dennison on firearms charges, the police impounded and

inventoried the truck. Id. Police later found a second machine gun and several

other firearms. Id. at 1207.

After pleading guilty to firearms charges, Dennison appealed the legality

of the protective sweep. Id. We examined whether the officer-safety exception

7 In our case, the officers never asked for Ms. Richardson’s consent to search the Impala. 20  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 21

justified “a protective sweep of Mr. Dennison’s passenger compartment.” Id. at

1210. We began by noting that “[o]fficers can conduct a protective search of a

vehicle’s passenger compartment for weapons during an investigative detention

when officers have a reasonable belief that a suspect poses a danger.” Id. at

1210 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1036).

We affirmed after concluding that “the officers had a reasonable

suspicion that Mr. Dennison was dangerous and able to gain immediate control

of weapons.” Id. at 1214. From that, we ruled that “[t]his reasonable belief of

Mr. Dennison’s threat to officer safety validated a protective sweep of the

truck’s cab.” Id. Otherwise stated, “in light of the totality of circumstances,”

we ruled that the “officers did have reasonable and articulable suspicion of Mr.

Dennison’s threat to officer safety to justify the protective sweep of his truck’s

passenger compartment.” Id. at 1212.

In so ruling, we examined what the officers knew about the connection

between him and Allen. Id. at 1213. We declared it important that the officer

“found both men in Mr. Dennison’s truck in an apartment complex lot at 3:00

a.m., allegedly waiting for a tow truck.” Id. at 1212–13. We approved the

protective sweep after concluding that officers “could reasonably infer a

common purpose or ‘enterprise’ between the two men and believe that Mr.

Dennison knew of Mr. Allen’s arrest warrants and would want to conceal

evidence of any wrongdoing.” Id. at 1213.

21  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 22

We also emphasized that “the detention, arrest, and search occurred late

at night in a high-crime area, and officers could not clearly tell whether Mr.

Dennison had weapons in the vehicle within reach.” Id. We found it important

that “officers here were assisting in the late-night arrest of a potentially

dangerous suspect in a high-crime area.” Id. at 1214.

The facts supporting reasonable suspicion that Dennison was armed and

dangerous are much more compelling than Ms. Richardson’s dating relationship

with Williams. She was legally riding in her car on a public street at 8:23 p.m.,

not lurking in an apartment-complex parking lot at 3 a.m. She had arrived at her

boyfriend’s house, located on a residential street 8 lying in the expansive “East

Colfax Corridor,” not at a specific “apartment complex that had a high

incidence of nighttime car theft.” 9 Id. at 1205. Though the two cases involve

some superficial similarities (cooperation, providing valid identification, no

threatening behavior), id. at 1212, they differ greatly on what matters. 10

8 Williams’s father testified at the suppression hearing that an officer came across the street to explain the reason for the stop. Williams’s father recognized the officer as his neighbor from across the street. After explaining the traffic violation, the officer said, “Sorry we had to meet like this, chief,” before walking back to the patrol car. 9 That the “East Colfax Corridor” is a high-crime area doesn’t necessarily mean that the Williams’s house, the street, or the neighboring businesses are high-crime areas. Yet the officers’ testimony wasn’t specific about the crime rate at or near Williams’s residence. 10 The district court also mentioned in passing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304–05 (1999), for this proposition: “In addition, a car (footnote continued) 22  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 23

The police had reasonable suspicion that Williams was armed and

dangerous. If he had been alone and without active warrants, the police could

have conducted a protective sweep before letting him return to the car. That

would be an easy case under our precedents.

But this appeal is not so easy. Here, what matters is whether the police

had reasonable suspicion that Ms. Richardson was armed and dangerous. The

government’s reliance on Dennison to satisfy this requirement fails.

The district court considered other cases too. The court deemed Canada,

76 F.4th 1304, to be “very relevant authority” for the appropriate test for

officer safety preceding a protective sweep. R. at 145. But as the court noted,

Canada differed in a key respect from the instant case: Canada concerned a

traffic stop involving only a driver and not a passenger. R. at 145. So nothing

in Canada sheds light on protective sweeps in Ms. Richardson’s circumstance.

The district court also reviewed United States v. Fager, 811 F.3d 381

(10th Cir. 2016). But that case concerned a challenged frisk of a motorist in

which a firearm was found on his person. Id. at 383. In justifying the pat-down,

we generally reviewed some cases involving officer safety. Among these were

Dennison, which we cited for the notion that a “‘common purpose or enterprise’

passenger . . . will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.” But again, this case is far different from ours. In Houghton, a trooper noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s pocket and methamphetamine in a passenger’s purse. Id. at 298. Obviously, none of this corresponds to Ms. Richardson’s situation. 23  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 24

also bears on the reasonable suspicion analysis.” Id. at 386. But that general

proposition is unhelpful in assessing the present protective sweep. And like

Canada, Fager involved a driver and no passengers. So it provides no help

either.

CONCLUSION

We vacate Williams’s conviction and remand for further proceedings.

24  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 25

No. 24-1510, United States v. Kylear Williams KELLY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I agree that there was reasonable suspicion to conclude that there was a firearm in

the car, that Ms. Richardson would have known of it, and that she would have immediate

access to it upon returning to the vehicle. Ct. Op. at 14. However, I disagree with the

court’s conclusion that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Ms.

Richardson was dangerous and would affirm the district court’s decision denying the

motion to suppress and the conviction.

The principal justification for a protective sweep is for officer safety. United

States v. Canada, 76 F.4th 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 2023). Such concerns are “both

legitimate and weighty” due to the risks that come with even run-of-the-mill traffic stops.

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977). Therefore, officers may “take steps

reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307 (citation

modified).

We evaluate reasonableness from the perspective of an objectively reasonable

officer based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Samilton, 56 F.4th

820, 827 (10th Cir. 2022). “[O]ur evaluation is guided by common sense and ordinary

human experience.” United States v. Fonseca, 744 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 2014)

(quoting United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009)). And we “defer to

all reasonable inferences made by law enforcement officers in light of their knowledge

and professional experience[.]” United States v. Gurule, 935 F.3d 878, 885 (10th Cir.

2019) (quoting United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015)). Thus, our  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 26

analysis ultimately turns on whether a “reasonably prudent” officer “would be warranted

in the belief that his safety . . . was in danger” given the attendant circumstances.

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (citation modified).

The court lists several facts to conclude that there was “[n]othing about Ms.

Richardson during the stop” to suggest that she was “ready to die in a shootout with four

officers.” Ct. Op. at 14–15. But we must consider all the attendant circumstances. And

there are other facts that weigh in favor of reasonableness.

Here, knowing that they were going to arrest Mr. Williams for outstanding

warrants, the officers requested cover officers for officer safety before removing any of

the occupants from the vehicle. III R. 16–17. The officers testified that they were going

to release Ms. Richardson and allow her to drive the car away, but had concerns about

their safety given they reasonably suspected that there was a firearm in the car. Id. at 16–

17, 40–41. One officer testified, based on his training and experience, that safety

concerns are heightened where, as here, an individual is being taken away from his or her

romantic partner because “that individual could access a firearm if one potentially is

inside the vehicle and try to harm officers.” Id. at 41. Another officer echoed these

concerns. Id. at 18. I see no reason not to defer to that reasonable inference here.

Thus, the fact that Ms. Richardson was in a romantic relationship with Mr.

Williams and the fact that he “was contemporaneously being arrested” both weigh in

favor of a finding of dangerousness. United States v. Johnson, 163 F.4th 933, 944 (5th

Cir. 2026) (Haynes, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also Fishbein ex rel.

Fishbein v. City of Glenwood Springs, 469 F.3d 957, 962 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding a

2  Appellate Case: 24-1510 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 27

protective sweep justified where officers arresting a couple at their home reasonably

inferred that their teenage child could be inside, armed, and, “having just observed his

parents’ arrest, could be hostile to the arresting officers” because they knew the couple

had teenage children and that firearms had been present in the home).

Other facts support the officers’ decision to conduct a protective sweep. The stop

took place at night. And the officers testified, based on their knowledge and experience,

that the surrounding area was dangerous, noting that it had high frequencies of violent

crime, was an “open-air drug market,” and had armed gang members operating in it. III

R. 8–9; 34–35. Both of those factors also weigh in favor of reasonableness. United

States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1213 (10th Cir. 2005).

Therefore, when considering all the facts, and when viewing them in the light

most favorable to the government, I believe a reasonably prudent officer would be

warranted in fearing for his or her safety. Long, 463 U.S. at 1050; see Johnson, 163 F.4th

at 946 (Haynes, J., dissenting).

Our inquiry into reasonableness should avoid “engag[ing] in unrealistic second-

guessing of a police officer’s decision.” Fonseca, 744 F.3d at 681 (citation modified).

Unfortunately, that is what the court’s opinion does here. Therefore, I respectfully

dissent.

3