United States v. Harry

23-7106 United States v. Harry

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

August Term 2024 Argued: December 2, 2024 Decided: March 7, 2025

No. 23-7106

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. KENSTON HARRY, Defendant-Appellant. *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

Before: LYNCH, LEE, AND PÉREZ, Circuit Judges.

On appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Arterton, J.).

Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry raises a question of first impression in this Circuit: whether the government’s warrantless use of a stationary pole camera situated outside an individual’s business for approximately 50 days qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search. Because we conclude that it does not, we hold that the district court was not required to exclude the pole-camera footage at Harry’s criminal trial for drug trafficking. Additionally, we determine that the district court properly concluded that Harry is not entitled to “safety-valve” relief under

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), which provides that where specified criteria are met, a court is not required to impose any statutory minimum set forth in the Controlled Substances Act. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

CONOR M. REARDON (Patrick J. Doherty, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), of counsel, Assistant United States Attorney, New Haven, CT, for Vanessa Roberts Avery, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, for Appellee.

BRUCE S. HARVEY (Brandon A. Bullard, The Bullard Law Firm, Atlanta, GA, on the brief), Law Office of Bruce S. Harvey, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.

MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judge:

This appeal chiefly concerns the admissibility of pole-camera evidence

obtained without a warrant in a criminal proceeding, which raises a novel Fourth

Amendment question in this Circuit. Defendant-Appellant Kenston Harry

appeals a judgment of conviction for possessing controlled substances with intent

to distribute and conspiracy to accomplish the same. We conclude that, in the

circumstances present here, law enforcement’s use of a stationary pole camera to

monitor the exterior of Harry’s business did not constitute a search requiring a

warrant.

2  Harry also appeals his sentence. Applying our precedent, we determine

that the district court did not err in finding that Harry had not met his burden of

showing he is entitled under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to “safety-valve” relief from his

ten-year mandatory minimum. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

BACKGROUND

The events relevant to this appeal center, in the main, on the Action Audio

Store (“Action Audio”), an automotive business in Hartford, Connecticut, that

Harry owned and operated. The exterior of Action Audio and its adjoining

parking lot are situated in a “triangle” bordered by two streets. Appellant’s App’x

57–64; Gov’t’s App’x 585–87. On one side of the parking lot, there is a low fence

with railings spaced far enough apart to view the parking lot clearly through them.

Id. In addition, that fence bore, at the time of the captured pole-camera footage,

colorful signs and advertisements. Id. These signs also did not visually obstruct

the view of the premises.

Around March 2020, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents

began investigating Harry’s co-defendant Tajh Wiley, who was the leader of the

drug-trafficking scheme. Nearly a year later, agents tracked Wiley to Action

3 Audio, where they observed him receiving boxes from a cargo van before traveling

to Harry’s residence in Bloomfield, Connecticut (“Bloomfield residence”). Later

that day, local law enforcement in Yonkers, New York, arrested Wiley after

stopping his car and finding a kilogram of cocaine. From jail, Wiley called Harry

and conveyed that the police “kn[e]w a lot” about their activities. Following

Wiley’s release from jail in Yonkers, federal investigators initiated a wiretap of

Wiley’s cell phone and captured incriminating conversations between him and

Harry, among others.

In April 2021, as part of their investigation, DEA agents affixed a video

surveillance camera to a utility pole on a lot across the street from Action Audio.

The camera was connected to the internet and fed footage to DEA investigators,

who could remotely tilt, pan, and zoom the camera. The camera recorded 24 hours

per day for approximately 50 days. Its feed captured Action Audio’s exterior, the

outdoor parking lot, and, occasionally, a slice of the interior of the business’s

garage bay whenever the garage door was raised. 1

1 For an overlapping period, the government also obtained warrants to collect real-time and historical cellular site location information (“CSLI”) from Harry’s cell phone. The CSLI collected is not at issue in this appeal.

4  In June 2021, Harry was arrested. Investigators searched Action Audio, the

Bloomfield residence, his vehicles, and his cell phone. 2 They found narcotics and

firearms in both Action Audio and the Bloomfield residence. 3 Specifically, at

Action Audio, agents uncovered more than 1.5 kilograms of marijuana, along with

a digital scale and powder residue. They also seized three loaded firearms near

the marijuana, in addition to a semi-automatic assault rifle with two loaded, large-

capacity magazines, a shotgun and corresponding boxes of ammunition, a

revolver, and other scattered ammunition. None of the firearms at Action Audio

were registered to Harry, and the assault rifle and related magazines were illegally

possessed in the state of Connecticut. At the Bloomfield residence, which Harry

shared with his brothers and cousin, agents found kilogram quantities of fentanyl,

cocaine, and marijuana. Near the narcotics, investigators also recovered a pistol

not registered to Harry, along with assorted ammunition.

I. Procedural History

The district court denied Harry’s motion to suppress the pole-camera

evidence. The government introduced 28 minutes’ worth of footage at trial, which

2 Defendant does not challenge the constitutionality of these searches. 3Harry was arrested in his Bentley, where investigators found a pistol for which he possessed a valid permit and loaded ammunition magazines.

5 showed Wiley, Harry, and another co-defendant transferring bags of what the

government adduced to be controlled substances to their vehicles. A jury

convicted Harry of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, cocaine, and

marijuana, respectively; and of conspiracy to accomplish the same. 4

The district court sentenced Harry principally to ten years (120 months) on

the fentanyl- and cocaine-related charges, including conspiracy—the mandatory

minimum under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1); id. §

846. For the possession of marijuana count, it sentenced Harry to five years (60

months), to run concurrently. In so doing, it denied Harry safety-valve relief from

his ten-year sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and the Sentencing Guidelines § 5C1.2

provide for such relief; where certain criteria are met, the court is relieved of the

obligation to impose the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum. The district

court thereafter denied Harry’s motion to reconsider his eligibility for safety-valve

relief.

Harry timely appealed, raising (1) the admissibility of the pole-camera

footage at his trial; and (2) the applicability of the safety-valve provision to his

sentence.

4Harry had conceded guilt as to the marijuana count and as to the conspiracy charge insofar as marijuana was concerned.

6  STANDARD OF REVIEW

As to Harry’s claim involving the admission of pole-camera evidence, “this

Court reviews the district court’s factual findings” in connection with its denial of

a suppression motion “for clear error, and its application of law to fact de novo.”

United States v. Lewis, 62 F.4th 733, 740 (2d Cir. 2023). Provided there is error in

admitting evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we evaluate

that error for harmlessness. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 660 (2d Cir. 2001).

As to Harry’s claim to safety-valve relief, we review the district court’s

underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Ortiz, 136 F.3d 882, 883

(2d Cir. 1997). The district court commits clear error only if we are left “with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.

Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 577

(2024).

DISCUSSION

We consider for the first time in this Circuit whether the warrantless use of

a stationary pole camera located outside of a defendant’s business for

approximately 50 days violates the Fourth Amendment—and therefore whether

7 the evidence obtained from that endeavor must be excluded at a criminal trial. 5

Additionally, we examine whether 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) entitles Harry to relief from

the statutory mandatory minimum for certain of his narcotics convictions. After

careful inquiry, we answer both questions in the negative.

I. The Pole-Camera Usage Did Not Constitute an Unreasonable Search

A. The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule

The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and

seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see id. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). Warrantless

searches are ordinarily “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—

subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). In accordance with the Fourth

Amendment’s protections, “[c]ourts have . . . developed the ‘exclusionary rule’—

which requires trial courts to exclude unlawfully seized evidence from criminal

trials—as the ‘principal judicial remedy to deter Fourth Amendment violations.’”

5We recently considered law-enforcement usage of cameras in a different Fourth Amendment context, in a case that concerned the use of an iPhone camera to view the interior of a defendant’s car through tinted windows. See United States v. Poller, --- F.4th ---, No. 24-75-cr, 2025 WL 555563 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2025). Our analysis is fully consistent with the analysis in Poller.

8 United States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223, 231 n.5 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Utah v. Strieff,

579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016)).

But not all law enforcement-initiated surveillance qualifies as a “search.”

Rather, a Fourth Amendment search occurs only if the target had a “‘reasonable

expectation of privacy’ in the area searched.” Lewis, 62 F.4th at 741 (quoting Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); accord Carpenter

v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 310 (2018). That standard, in turn, is defined by a

two-part, conjunctive test: “first, has the individual manifested a subjective

expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society

willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?" McKenzie, 13 F.4th at 232

(citation omitted). Put differently, to benefit from the exclusionary rule, Harry had

to show that he maintained both a subjective and an objectively reasonable

expectation of privacy in Action Audio’s exterior and parking lot. See Lewis, 62

F.4th at 741 (explaining that “the proponent of the motion to suppress” carries the

“burden to establish that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights”).

Though many of our sister circuits have considered the issue of law

enforcement’s use of pole cameras in light of the Fourth Amendment, this question

is one of first impression in our Circuit. Nearly every circuit to have passed on the

9 question has held that pole cameras do not constitute a search within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 291 (4th

Cir. 2009); United States v. Dennis, 41 F.4th 732, 740–41 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied,

143 S. Ct. 2616 (2023); United States v. May-Shaw, 955 F.3d 563, 567–69 (6th Cir.

2020); United States v. Tuggle, 4 F.4th 505, 510–11 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v.

Hay, 95 F.4th 1304, 1313–18 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-72, 2024 WL 4874676

(U.S. Nov. 25, 2024). The First Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the use of a pole

camera in a criminal case, with the panel evenly split on whether there was no

search at all or whether there was one that the Fourth Amendment’s good-faith

exception excused. Compare United States v. Moore-Bush, 36 F.4th 320, 328 (1st Cir.

2022) (Barron, J., concurring) (concluding “that the good-faith exception to the

warrant requirement” applied), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. United States, 143 S.

Ct. 2494 (2023), with id. at 363 (Lynch, J., concurring) (finding neither a subjective,

nor an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy).

We now hold that the use of a stationary pole camera, at least as deployed

here—to monitor the publicly visible exterior of a target’s business for a period of

50 days—does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. We so

10 conclude after examining, in turn, Harry’s subjective and objective expectations of

privacy in this context.

B. Harry’s Subjective Expectation of Privacy

We first ask whether Harry has “manifested a subjective expectation of

privacy” in the exterior of Action Audio and its parking lot. See California v. Ciraolo,

476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). We have previously held that “what a person knowingly

exposes to the public . . . does not receive Fourth Amendment protection, yet what

a person tries to keep private . . . may be entitled to constitutional protection.”

United States v. Davis, 326 F.3d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 2003).

Harry made little to no effort to conceal the goings-on outside of Action

Audio. Here, only a very low fence borders one side of the Action Audio parking

lot. Through it, the parking lot and the exterior of Action Audio—and the

activities therein—remained clearly visible. See Appellant’s App’x 57–64; Gov’t’s

App’x 587. This is not the “10-foot fence” that the Ciraolo Court concluded clearly

demonstrated the defendant’s subjective expectation that passersby on foot would

be unable to see what was hidden behind. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.

Additionally, when the business’s garage door was open, some of the garage’s

interior could be glimpsed from the street. Gov’t’s App’x 587–88. “[W]hat a

person knowingly exposes to the public through an open door or window does 11 not receive Fourth Amendment protection.” Davis, 326 F.3d at 365. Moreover, it

would be incongruous for a proprietor of a business to claim a subjective privacy

interest in the publicly visible aspects of his business’s premises during work

hours. Harry has thus manifested no “subjective expectation of privacy in the

object of the challenged search.” See McKenzie, 13 F.4th at 232.

C. The Objective Reasonableness of Any Purported Expectation of Privacy

We next consider whether an expectation of privacy in the comings and

goings outside of Harry’s business is one that “society [is] willing to recognize . . .

as reasonable.” Id. We turn first to instructive precedent.

We have articulated an “open fields doctrine,” under which individuals

“generally do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in open and accessible

areas that the public is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” See United States v.

Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Katz,

389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own

home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); McKenzie, 13

F.4th at 232 (“[O]bservations of items in plain view (or plain hearing, smell, or

feel), and recoveries of abandoned property are not protected by the Fourth

Amendment under this test.”). So, for example, an individual enjoys no

12 objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in outdoor premises open to the

public, when a government inspector enters to examine smoke coming from the

owner’s chimney. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861,

862–65 (1974), Neither is one’s expectation of privacy objectively reasonable on a

property outsiders could enter at will or observe from the public highway, see Lace,

669 F.2d at 49–51; in an area that the government can observe by plane, see Dow

Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 239 (1986); or for a property visible

over a fence to individuals perched atop “a [hypothetical] truck or a two-level

bus,” see Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.

So, too, here. Action Audio’s parking lot and storefront were open—and

more importantly, visible—to the public. “Generally, the police are free to observe

whatever may be seen from a place where they are entitled to be.” United States v.

Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997). Neither is there any basis for us to treat the

occasionally open garage differently. “[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken

measures to restrict some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer’s

observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which

renders the activities clearly visible.” Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.

13  And Harry is on especially infirm footing here, because the surveilled area

was his business, rather than his home. Privacy expectations are “most

heightened” in one’s home. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (quoting

Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213). There may well be scenarios in which a person maintains

an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in aspects of her business, but

here, given that the pole camera monitored only what was publicly visible, Harry

cannot clear this additional hurdle. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)

(“An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from,

and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.”); Dow Chem.

Co., 476 U.S. at 237 (noting that “the Government has ‘greater latitude to conduct

warrantless inspections of commercial property’” (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452

U.S. 594, 598 (1981))).

Finally, a trio of Supreme Court cases to which Harry points does not

contradict our conclusion. Harry tells us that these cases show that there is

something about the breadth and depth of the government’s activities here that

converts the pole-camera usage into a search. Specifically, he takes issue with the

camera’s “sleepless, unblinking” recording over 50 days, which he argues is

14 materially different from a DEA agent’s physical surveillance. Appellant’s Br. 30.

We are unpersuaded.

When modern technology enhances law enforcement’s traditional

surveillance capabilities, the Supreme Court has recognized a Fourth Amendment

search only when law enforcement uses particularly invasive forms of

technological surveillance—involving, for example, technology that is either not

widely accessible or particularly all-encompassing. First, in Kyllo v. United States,

the Supreme Court held that the use of a “thermal-imaging device aimed at a

private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the

home” qualifies as a search requiring a warrant. 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001). It

reasoned that “the Government use[d] a device that is not in general public use, to

explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without

physical intrusion.” Id. at 40. Second, in United States v. Jones, the Court concluded

that the government undertakes an unreasonable search when it attaches a GPS

tracking device to a person’s vehicle without first obtaining a warrant. 565 U.S.

400, 404–05 (2012). There, in determining that a search had occurred, the Court

relied on the law of trespass—explaining that the government “physically

occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” Id.; see also

15 id. at 417 n.* (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the GPS device was not

“stationary” and that “[a] car’s movements . . . are its owner’s movements”). 6 By

contrast, the pole camera used here constitutes neither a form of inaccessible

technology capturing details unknowable without physical intrusion, nor a

physically trespassory attachment to an object that moves along with the target.

Additionally, the camera’s tilting, panning, and zooming functionalities, and its

connection to the internet, are rudimentary in comparison to the thermal-imaging

technology employed in Kyllo.

Third, the Supreme Court held in Carpenter that retrospective cell-site

location information (“CSLI”) collected for a period of seven days from a target’s

phone constitutes a search. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 296, 300, 310 n.3. CSLI allows

the government to locate a surveilled individual’s movements with great

precision, because phones ordinarily tap into the wireless network of local cell

sites “several times a minute.” Id. at 300. The Carpenter Court therefore expressed

unique concern that CSLI “provides an all-encompassing record of the [cell phone]

holder’s whereabouts” and “an intimate window into a person’s life.” Id. at 311.

6We note that the Court warned that it “do[es] not make trespass the exclusive test”—rather, “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject” to the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (emphasis omitted).

16 A cell phone is “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy’” and “tracks nearly exactly

the movements of its owner.” Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385

(2014)); see also id. at 312 (observing that CSLI data provides “near perfect

surveillance” of a “retrospective” nature).

But the Court also expressly cautioned that its ruling in Carpenter was “a

narrow one.” Id. at 316. Notably, it “d[id] not . . . call into question conventional

surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.” Id. (emphasis added).

Devices such as the pole camera at issue here are thus expressly excluded from

Carpenter’s holding. Additionally, the stationary pole camera trained only on

Action Audio’s exterior does not meaningfully resemble an all-encompassing

“feature of human anatomy” like one’s cell phone.

We conclude that here, the DEA’s warrantless collection of footage of

activities in public view at Harry’s business, for a period of 50 days, using a

stationary pole camera, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the

district court did not err in admitting video from the camera’s feed at Harry’s trial.

II. Harry Was Not Eligible for Safety-Valve Relief from the Mandatory Minimum Imposed

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), a court will not apply the mandatory minimum

to a defendant convicted, like Harry, of fentanyl- or cocaine-related charges under

17 the Controlled Substances Act where five criteria are met. This safety-valve

provision, if applicable, would have relieved Harry of his statutorily mandated

ten-year sentence.

Before us, Harry contests only the district court’s determination as to one of

the provision’s five criteria—whether he “possess[ed] a firearm or other

dangerous weapon . . . in connection with the offense” of which he was convicted.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2). Under that provision, Harry bore the burden of proving at

sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not possess the firearms

found at Action Audio, the Bloomfield residence, and on his person “in

connection” with the drug-trafficking scheme. See id.; see also United States v.

Jimenez, 451 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1110

(2d Cir. 1997).

The statute’s language requiring that the firearms have been used “in

connection” with the crime, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2), has been interpreted as

“equivalent to the ‘in relation to’ language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).” See United

States v. DeJesus, 219 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000). Section 924(c)(1), in turn, is a

sentencing enhancement that applies if the defendant uses or carries a firearm in

relation to or in furtherance of a specified crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

18  In our parallel § 924(c)(1) cases, we have explained that to find the requisite

nexus between the firearm and the crime, the weapon “at least must facilitate, or

have the potential of facilitating,” the crime. DeJesus, 219 F.3d at 122 (quoting

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)). Thus, “the ultimate question is

whether the firearm afforded some advantage (actual or potential, real or

contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug trafficking.” United States v. Snow,

462 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A

court “can consider relevant factors like the type of drug activity that is being

conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the gun is

loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under

which the gun is found.” Lewis, 62 F.4th at 746 (internal quotation marks omitted

and alterations adopted).

Applying this standard here, we hold that the district court did not clearly

err in concluding that Harry failed to carry his burden of demonstrating his

possession of myriad firearms lacked a connection to his drug-trafficking

activities. See Ortiz, 136 F.3d at 883 (setting forth the clear-error standard of review

for the district court’s factual findings at sentencing). The firearms at Action

Audio, the Bloomfield residence, and on Harry’s person were readily accessible

19 and stored near large quantities of narcotics. Harry admitted to personally

carrying a pistol at nearly all times. In addition, the district court credited evidence

of a loaded pistol and ammunition found in Harry’s bedroom at the Bloomfield

residence, near a Burberry box of fentanyl and cocaine. Nearby were also buckets

of cocaine and three kilograms of marijuana. Id. At Action Audio, the site that

served “as the hub to distribute drugs,” Harry kept additional guns and

ammunition, including an assault rifle and large-capacity magazines banned in

the state of Connecticut, again near large quantities of marijuana. Appellant’s

App’x 1372–73 (Sent’g Tr. 69–70). Thus, in two places “central” to Harry’s

participation in a large-scale narcotics trafficking operation, id. at 1374 (Sent’g Tr.

71), Harry stored numerous firearms in close “proximity to drugs or drug profits,”

see Lewis, 62 F.4th at 746. These are the same factors that we concluded in Lewis

and Snow were sufficient to support conviction under 18 U.S.C. §924(c) beyond a

reasonable doubt. Lewis, 62 F.4th at 745–46; Snow, 462 F.3d at 62–63. If facts such

as these are sufficient to support a jury’s finding that a gun was used in furtherance

of a drug crime beyond a reasonable doubt, they are also sufficient to justify the

district court’s finding that Harry did not prove the opposite by a preponderance

of the evidence.

20  Consequently, we are satisfied that the district court did not clearly err in its

factual findings supporting its determination that Harry was not eligible for

safety-valve relief. We affirm the sentence the court imposed.

CONCLUSION

The government’s use of a stationary pole camera for 50 days to capture

scenes from the exterior of the Defendant’s business that were readily visible to

the public did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The district court was

thus not required to exclude the pole-camera evidence at Harry’s criminal trial.

Furthermore, Harry did not meet his burden of showing that he is entitled to

safety-valve relief from his mandatory-minimum sentence under the Controlled

Substances Act.

We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

21