United States v. Daigle

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 24-1889

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ROBERT DAIGLE,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Lipez and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

Zainabu Rumala, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for appellant. Randall E. Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

June 10, 2026  RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Robert Daigle appeals the

denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered in a search

of his home. According to Daigle, the government did not establish

probable cause to believe that child pornography would be found on

his home computer at the time of the search. The district court

concluded otherwise, relying on facts showing that, nine months

earlier, a computer with an IP address tied to Daigle's residence

had logged requests on a specialized network for three electronic

files that contained child pornography, all within ten minutes.

We conclude that these facts were sufficient to meet the probable

cause standard and thus affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts

This case arises from a decade-long investigation by law

enforcement into Freenet, a peer-to-peer network that "allows

users to anonymously share files, chat on message boards, and

access websites within the network." To put the legal issues in

context, we recount the basic mechanics of Freenet, as well as the

events that led the government to Daigle. We draw the facts from

the search warrant affidavit submitted in this case by Special

Agent Brian O'Sullivan of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI).

- 2 -  1. The Mechanics of Freenet

To access the Freenet network, "a user must first

download the Freenet software, which is free and publicly

available." A computer running the Freenet software "connects

directly to other computers running Freenet, which are called its

'peers.'" When a user installs Freenet, they "agree[] to provide

to the network a portion of the storage space on [their] computer

hard drive, so that files uploaded by Freenet users can be

distributed and stored across the network."

Once a user uploads a file to Freenet, "the software

breaks the file into pieces (called 'blocks') and encrypts each

piece." These encrypted blocks are then "distributed randomly"

and stored by peer computers. Freenet creates an "index piece,"

which contains a list of all the file's blocks, and assigns a

"unique key -- a series of letters, numbers and special

characters" -- to the file.

To download a file on Freenet, a user must have the key

associated with that file. When a user tries to download a file,

Freenet requests that file's blocks from other computers running

the Freenet software (the peers). Instead of requesting all the

blocks from one peer, Freenet "divide[s] up" the block requests

"in roughly equal amounts among the user's peers." If a peer

computer does not have the requested blocks, that peer will divide

up the request and ask additional peers for the missing blocks,

- 3 - and so on. Critically, just because a user requests a file does

not guarantee that they can retrieve the blocks for that file or

download it.

Freenet's design "attempts to hide" which user uploaded

or downloaded a file "by making it difficult to differentiate"

between the original requestor of a file and a peer who simply

forwarded another peer's request for that file. Still, "Freenet

warns its users in multiple ways that it does not guarantee

anonymity," including by explaining on its public website that it

does not mask a computer's IP address.

Although Freenet is not dedicated to child pornography,

users can "advertise and distribute images and videos of child

pornography" on the network.1 Importantly, Freenet does not offer

a search function, meaning that a user in search of child

pornography must first identify the key for a specific file and

then use that key to download the file. To obtain such a key,

Freenet users can go to "message boards" on the network, where

other users might post messages related to child pornography.

These message boards often have labels that are suggestive of the

1A peer-reviewed, publicly available academic paper studied 70,000 keys "posted to forums [on Freenet] openly dedicated to child sexual exploitation and confirmed to include known [child pornography] images." Brian N. Levine et al., Statistical Detection of Downloaders in Freenet, Procs. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng'rs Int'l Workshop on Priv. Eng'g, May 2017, at 8. That study determined that approximately 35% of Freenet's overall traffic related to requests for files using those keys. See id.

- 4 - sexual exploitation of children. Freenet users can also access

websites that only operate within the network, known as

"Freesites." Certain Freesites contain viewable images of child

pornography, along with keys related to child pornography files.

To support investigations into the sharing of child

pornography on Freenet, law enforcement officers have access to a

modified version of the Freenet software, which has been loaded

onto government computers. This modified version is "nearly

identical to Freenet," except that it permits officers to track

certain information about each request for file blocks that

government computers receive from Freenet users. This information

includes the requesting user's IP address.

Law enforcement officers "do not target specific peers

on Freenet nor do [they] solicit requests from any peers." Rather,

they "collect keys associated with suspected child pornography

files" and only investigate Freenet users who use those keys to

request files. Officers obtain such keys from Freenet message

boards, Freesites, and their prior investigations.

A peer-reviewed, publicly available academic paper

describes a mathematical formula for determining whether a request

for a file of interest originated from a given computer. See Brian

N. Levine et al., Statistical Detection of Downloaders in Freenet,

Procs. Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng'rs Int'l Workshop on Priv.

Eng'g, May 2017, at 8. Based on his training and experience,

- 5 - O'Sullivan "believe[d] [the formula] to be a reliable method" for

law enforcement officers to use in identifying which computer on

the Freenet network initiated a request for child pornography

files.

2. The Investigation

Using their modified version of Freenet, law enforcement

officers identified a computer with an IP address of 96.230.244.94,

which was running the Freenet software. Within a ten-minute

timeframe, the user of that computer had requested the blocks of

three different files. Officers knew that each of those three

files contained child pornography. They had acquired the keys for

the three files from various sources: a Freenet message board, a

Freesite, and a previous investigation. But they were "not aware

of how, or from where, this particular Freenet user obtained [the]

key[s] in order to attempt to retrieve the files of interest."

The Freenet user initiated the three file requests on

Sunday, April 11, 2021, at 7:10 PM, 7:13 PM, and 7:20 PM. Based

on the mathematical formula discussed above, O'Sullivan believed

that this Freenet user was "the original requestor" of the three

files. Law enforcement officers linked the user's IP address to

a computer located in a home in Waltham, Massachusetts, which they

subsequently confirmed was Daigle's residence.

As O'Sullivan explained, requesting blocks associated

with a file on Freenet is equivalent to a "user attempt[ing] to

- 6 - download the file's contents from Freenet." Making such an

attempt, however, does not mean that the user "retrieved all of

the necessary [blocks] to successfully download the file." During

their investigation, law enforcement officers were unable to

confirm whether the user who had requested the three files on April

11 had in fact downloaded them.

After recounting the steps that led law enforcement

officers to Daigle's residence, O'Sullivan described in his

affidavit the characteristics common to "consumers" of child

pornography. As he explained, these characteristics include

collecting and maintaining child pornography materials "for

several years" and "go[ing] to great lengths to conceal and protect

[those collections] from discovery, theft, and damage." According

to O'Sullivan, consumers of child pornography often store their

collections in various places, including their computers and

digital devices.

Relying on his experience, O'Sullivan recounted that

individuals who possess child pornography on one digital storage

device are likely to possess it on another device as well. As he

put it, this makes it "more likely than not that evidence of [such]

access will be found in [the suspect's] home." Ultimately,

O'Sullivan believed that a Freenet user at Daigle's residence

"likely display[ed] characteristics common to consumers of child

pornography."

- 7 -  In his affidavit, O'Sullivan also detailed his training

and experience in investigating computer-related crimes generally,

including those involving child pornography. He explained that a

"computer's ability to store images in digital form makes the

computer itself an ideal repository for child pornography."

According to O'Sullivan, "a computer user's Internet activities

generally leave traces or 'footprints' in the web cache and history

files of the browser used," and "[s]uch information is often

maintained indefinitely until overwritten by other data." He

further described how "[e]lectronic files downloaded to a storage

medium can be stored for years at little or no cost" and can be

"recovered months or years later" after being deleted. Thus,

O'Sullivan attested that there was probable cause to believe that

evidence of child pornography would be found on a storage medium

at Daigle's residence, even months after the attempted downloads.

The government submitted the search warrant application

for Daigle's residence on January 10, 2022, nine months after the

requests for the Freenet files at issue. The next day, following

authorization from a magistrate judge, law enforcement officers

executed the search warrant; during the search, they discovered

files containing child pornography.

B. Procedural History

Based on the evidence seized during the search, a grand

jury indicted Daigle for receipt of child pornography, in violation

- 8 - of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1). In March 2024, Daigle

moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the January 2022

search.2 The district court denied Daigle's motion, concluding

that O'Sullivan's affidavit established probable cause to believe

that a search of Daigle's residence would lead to evidence of child

pornography; it also explicitly held that the information in the

warrant was not stale. See United States v. Daigle, 731 F. Supp.

3d 168, 171-72 (D. Mass. 2024). Alternatively, the court

determined that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule

would apply, thus permitting the government to rely on the evidence

from the search. See id. at 173. Daigle entered a conditional

guilty plea, while preserving his right to appeal the ruling

denying his motion to suppress.

Daigle then timely appealed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In evaluating a ruling on a motion to suppress, "[w]e

review de novo the district court's legal conclusion about whether

a given set of facts amounts to probable cause." United States v.

Coleman, 149 F.4th 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.

Gonzalez, 113 F.4th 140, 147 (1st Cir. 2024)). Here, Daigle argued

2Daigle also requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), to challenge the veracity of the warrant affidavit. The district court denied his request, and Daigle does not appeal that ruling. See United States v. Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d 168, 172-73 (D. Mass. 2024).

- 9 - in his motion that the search warrant affidavit was insufficient

to support a finding of probable cause, and there was no

evidentiary hearing of any kind. In such cases, we "accord[]

deference to the reasonable inferences" that the magistrate judge

issuing the search warrant "may have drawn" from the facts stated

in the affidavit. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United

States v. Sylvestre, 78 F.4th 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2023)); see United

States v. Cortez, 108 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2024).

III. DISCUSSION

Daigle argues that O'Sullivan's affidavit failed to

establish probable cause to justify a search of his residence for

evidence of child pornography, including because the information

in the affidavit was stale. As we explain, we disagree.

A. The Probable Cause Standard

When the government applies for a warrant, it "must

demonstrate probable cause to believe that (1) a crime has been

committed -- the 'commission' element, and (2) enumerated evidence

of the offense will be found at the place searched -- the so-called

'nexus' element." Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 148 (quoting United

States v. Roman, 942 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2019)). In evaluating

the nexus requirement, "the magistrate judge must 'make a

practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

circumstances set forth in the [search warrant]

affidavit[,] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or

- 10 - evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" Id.

(second alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). "Fair probability is less than a

more-likely-than not standard." Id.

Both elements of the probable cause inquiry "include a

temporal component." Id. (quoting United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95

F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 1996)). "Thus, the magistrate judge must

'consider the accuracy and reliability of the historical facts

related in the affidavit[].'" Id. (quoting Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d at

113). In doing so, the magistrate judge "must determine 'whether

the totality of the circumstances reasonably inferable from the

affidavit[]' establishes a fair probability that evidence of the

crime will be found in the place to be searched 'at about the time

the search warrant would issue, rather than at some [earlier]

time.'" Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Zayas-Diaz,

95 F.3d at 113).

When the information in an affidavit "establishe[s]

probable cause at some point in the past but does not support

probable cause at the time of the warrant's issuance," that

information is considered "stale." Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting United States v. McLellan, 792 F.3d 200, 210 (1st Cir.

2015)). There is no bright-line rule for staleness. In evaluating

a staleness claim, "we do not measure the timeliness of information

simply by counting the number of days that have elapsed."

- 11 - McLellan, 792 F.3d at 210 (quoting United States v.

Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2008)). Rather,

"we must assess the nature of the information, the nature and

characteristics of the suspected criminal activity, and the likely

endurance of the information." Id. (quoting Morales-Aldahondo,

524 F.3d at 119).

If probable cause did not exist but a magistrate judge

nonetheless authorized the search, then "the evidence obtained

from the search is usually suppressed," unless the good-faith

exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Gonzalez, 113 F.4th

at 148.

B. Analysis

Daigle lodges two specific challenges to the district

court's ruling denying his motion to suppress. First, he argues

that there was not enough information in the search warrant

affidavit to believe that he intentionally accessed child

pornography. Second, he contends that the information in the

affidavit was stale because it described attempted downloads of

child pornography that had occurred nine months earlier. We are

not persuaded by either argument.

1. Intentionality

We start with Daigle's contention that the government

did not establish probable cause to believe that he intentionally,

- 12 - rather than coincidentally, attempted to download child

pornography.

In making this argument, Daigle emphasizes that the

government has never alleged that Freenet's "primary

purpose . . . [is] the trading of child pornography." Thus,

Daigle maintains, the mere fact that he joined the Freenet network

cannot prove that he did so with the intent of accessing child

pornography. Daigle also points out that a Freenet user can

request a file without knowing the contents of that file, given

that a key is not attached to a thumbnail or hyperlink that would

reveal the file's contents. Although a key could contain a term

suggestive of child pornography (for example, "lolita"), he

emphasizes that the warrant affidavit does not mention any such

terms associated with the keys that he used. He also highlights

that the affidavit provides no information about how he obtained

the keys. Finally, Daigle reiterates the government's concession

that requesting a file on Freenet does not guarantee that a user

will retrieve all the blocks for that file such that they can

successfully download it.

To be sure, Daigle raises valid points about the features

of Freenet and the limits of the information in the government's

search warrant application. But in framing his arguments on

appeal, Daigle does not fully grapple with the applicable legal

standard.

- 13 -  As we have repeatedly held, probable cause requires only

a "fair probability" that evidence of the crime will be found in

the place to be searched. Gonzalez, 113 F.4th at 148. In

determining whether that standard has been met, courts must

evaluate the totality of the information presented by the

government through the lens of common sense. See id. And "an

officer [need not] rule out potentially innocent explanations for

every piece of evidence before reaching a reasonable conclusion

that there is probable cause." United States v. Flores, 888 F.3d

537, 545 (1st Cir. 2018).

The facts here showed that a Freenet user at Daigle's

residence initiated three requests to download three separate

files, each of which the government knew to contain child

pornography, all within ten minutes. The facts also indicated

that Freenet requires a user to engage in a complicated, multi-step

process to request a file. On this record, we see no error by the

district court in concluding that the unique features of Freenet,

combined with the multiple requests within a short period of time,

supported a fair probability that "a [Freenet] user at [Daigle's]

residence intentionally requested the files to gain access to child

pornography." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 171. That it remained

possible that this user's actions were innocent and unrelated to

viewing child pornography does not undercut that conclusion.

- 14 -  In urging us to reverse the district court's ruling,

Daigle relies heavily on United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d

Cir. 2008), but the facts of that case are distinct in important

ways. In Falso, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

found that the FBI agent's "inconclusive statements" about whether

the defendant had accessed or even attempted to access a publicly

available website featuring child pornography "f[ell] short of

establishing probable cause." Id. at 121. As the Second Circuit

reasoned, even if it inferred that Falso had accessed the website,

the affidavit lacked any allegation that the defendant had

"accessed, viewed or downloaded child pornography." Id. Likewise,

the court observed, the affidavit failed to offer particular

"details about the features and nature of the . . . site,"

including "whether the [child pornography] images were prominently

displayed or required an additional click of the mouse" or "were

downloadable." Id.

Because the affidavit here, like the one in Falso, did

not state that Daigle viewed or successfully downloaded the child

pornography files, Daigle argues that it could not establish

probable cause. But unlike the "inconclusive" statements by the

FBI agent in Falso, id., O'Sullivan specified that a Freenet user

at Daigle's residence had requested three files that the government

knew contained child pornography, all within ten minutes.

O'Sullivan also provided a thorough description of Freenet's

- 15 - unique "features and nature," id., including the multi-step

process for requesting a file and that a Freenet user would need

to obtain the file's key before requesting it. Those facts, taken

together, tended to negate the conclusion that the user in question

had accidentally stumbled onto the files. Thus, the totality of

the circumstances created a fair probability that the user had

attempted to download child pornography.

Daigle also argues that the district court erred by

factoring the anonymity of Freenet into its analysis, but, again,

we disagree. The court explained that "the anonymized nature of

Freenet . . . enhance[d] the probability that a user at [Daigle's]

residence sought child pornography and not some other innocuous

material." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 171. In doing so, the court

cited our decision in United States v. Anzalone, 923 F.3d 1 (1st

Cir. 2019), which concerned the FBI's investigation into Playpen,

an online forum that permitted users to distribute child

pornography. See id. at 2. In Anzalone, we held that "the totality

of the information asserted in the warrant affidavit -- Playpen's

hidden nature . . . , its registration requirement, its focus on

anonymity, and the image depicted on its homepage -- established

the fair probability that users went into Playpen to access child

pornography." Id. at 5.

Daigle maintains that Anzalone is off point because,

unlike Playpen, Freenet "is not hidden" but publicly available, it

- 16 - "does not require registration," and it "has no imagery indicating

illicit material." In Daigle's words, "the promise of anonymity"

on Freenet "does not equate to ill intent."

But Daigle acknowledges that we "did not focus solely on

the anonymous nature of Playpen in affirming the probable cause

finding" in Anzalone. Likewise, the district court here noted

that Freenet's anonymity was "independently insufficient to

establish probable cause." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 171. In

fact, the court devoted only one sentence of its analysis to

Freenet's anonymity and instead focused on the circumstances as a

whole. See id.

Just as importantly, we rejected the claim in Anzalone

that a court should treat as "not indicative of criminality" the

fact that online users had to "take several . . . affirmative

steps to locate Playpen." 923 F.3d at 5 (emphasis added). As we

explained, the defendant's argument overlooked that probable cause

"hinge[s] not on discrete pieces of standalone evidence, but on

the totality of circumstances." Id. Here, the "affirmative steps"

that a Freenet user would need to take to access a child

pornography file -- downloading the Freenet software, obtaining

the specific key for that file without the benefit of a search

function, and making block requests from peers -- are important

aspects of the overall probable cause picture.

- 17 -  Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree

with the district court that "it was reasonable for investigators

to infer that three separate requests for three different files

known to contain child pornography within a short timeframe

[indicated more than] mere coincidence." Daigle, 731 F. Supp. 3d

at 171.

2. Staleness

Next, Daigle contends that the information in the search

warrant affidavit was stale and thus could not prop up a finding

of probable cause. To support his argument, he points to the

nine-month gap between the download requests on Freenet and the

search warrant application. In his view, even if the facts alleged

in the affidavit could support a conclusion that he intentionally

requested child pornography files on Freenet, those facts were

insufficient to permit the conclusion that he would have those

files nine months later.

Although Daigle concedes that "the passage of time alone

does not necessarily render information stale," he maintains that

O'Sullivan's affidavit lacked specific facts indicating that child

pornography would "still [be] located" in his home at the time of

the search. According to Daigle, his "limited encounter with child

pornography" on Freenet was not enough to conclude that he was a

consumer of child pornography, which in turn undermined any

inference that he would retain illicit materials indefinitely.

- 18 -  On the record here, we cannot agree with Daigle's

staleness arguments. In our view, the totality of the facts in

O'Sullivan's affidavit added up to a fair probability that Daigle

was a consumer of child pornography. That Daigle engaged in a

multi-step process to request, in quick succession, three files

known to the government to contain child pornography adequately

indicated an intent to download illicit materials. From this

activity, it was reasonable for the district court to infer that

he was a collector of child pornography who would store such

materials. See Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d at 118-19 (holding

that three-year-old information was not stale in light of agent's

testimony that "a person who uses a computer to access child

pornography is likely to use his computer both to augment and to

store the collected images"); see also McLellan, 792 F.3d at 209

n.5 ("[C]ourts have held time and time again that child pornography

traders and collectors maintain their collections for long periods

of time, and often store [them] in safe, close, and easily

accessible locations.").

In arguing to the contrary, Daigle relies heavily on

United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015), but that

case does not help his position. To be sure, the Second Circuit

agreed with the defendant's staleness argument in Raymonda. See

id. at 117. As the court pointed out, the affidavit supporting

the search warrant application "contained no evidence" that the

- 19 - suspect "had deliberately sought to view [certain] thumbnails" of

child pornography on a particular website "or that he discovered

[that website] while searching for child pornography." Id. at

117. Indeed, the government agent who applied for the warrant

"only uncovered the website through an innocuous link on the

message board of another site not explicitly associated with child

pornography." Id. Thus, the Second Circuit reasoned, the facts

in the case were "at least equally consistent with an innocent

user inadvertently stumbling upon a child pornography website,

being horrified at what he saw, and promptly closing the window."

Id. "Under those circumstances, absent any indicia that the

suspect was a collector of child pornography likely to hoard

pornographic files," the court concluded that a "single incident

of access" was not enough to justify a search of the suspect's

computer more than nine months later. Id.

The facts of this case are different. Critically, the

affidavit here supports the conclusion that Daigle did not

"innocent[ly] stumble" upon the child pornography files on

Freenet. Id. at 121. Rather, O'Sullivan detailed the involved,

multi-step process for requesting such files on the network. This

complicated process "tend[ed] to negate the possibility that

[Daigle's] brush with child pornography was a purely negligent or

inadvertent encounter." Id. at 115. Indeed, as the Second Circuit

recognized in Raymonda, courts have found probable cause (and

- 20 - rejected staleness arguments) based on "a single incident of

possession or receipt . . . [when] the suspect's access to the

pornographic images depended on a series of sufficiently

complicated steps to suggest his willful intention to view the

files." Id. (emphasis added).

Daigle next points to United States v. Weber, 923 F.2d

1338 (9th Cir. 1990), to shore up his argument, but that case is

also readily distinguishable. Weber is not a staleness case per

se, but Daigle relies on it for the principle that O'Sullivan's

statements about the habits of consumers of child pornography

cannot be relevant to the staleness analysis when the government

has failed to show that he is such a consumer. The evidence in

Weber that the defendant was a consumer of child pornography,

however, was much weaker than the evidence here. The U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that, although the search

warrant affidavit described how the defendant had received

advertising materials that "apparently" contained child

pornography years earlier, the affidavit did not suggest that he

had requested those materials. Id. at 1344. The court was also

unmoved by the fact that the defendant had "answered a

government-generated advertisement for child pornography and

ordered materials," because those materials would not be delivered

until "just before" the warrant's execution. Id. Those facts

aside, the court described the affidavit as offering "rambling

- 21 - boilerplate recitations" about "the habits ascribed to" child

pornography collectors, without tying the defendant's own conduct

to those habits. Id. at 1345. Thus, the court concluded that

probable cause for the search was lacking.

By contrast, O'Sullivan's affidavit did not rest on such

shaky ground. Rather, the totality of the information in the

affidavit -- that Daigle attempted to download three child

pornography files within ten minutes -- permitted the reasonable

inference that he was a consumer of child pornography. Because

there were enough facts to conclude that Daigle was a consumer of

child pornography, it was reasonable to infer that he would collect

and then store child pornography materials nine months after the

attempted downloads on Freenet.

But even if we disagreed that the facts demonstrated a

fair probability that Daigle was a consumer of child pornography,

there was enough information in the affidavit to conclude that his

computer would yield relevant digital evidence nine months later.

When discussing computer-related crimes, O'Sullivan described at

length how files downloaded to a computer can be stored

indefinitely and recovered months, even years, after being

deleted. Given the durability of digital evidence, it was

reasonable to infer that evidence of the requests for the child

pornography files would remain on Daigle's computer many months

later. See United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 529 (3d Cir.

- 22 - 2010) (explaining that "information concerning [child pornography]

crimes has a relatively long shelf life" and thus "should not

be . . . quickly deemed stale," "especially" when "the crime in

question is accomplished through the use of a computer" because

"computers have long memories" (citation modified)); see also

United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (en

banc) (rejecting defendant's staleness argument based on

four-month delay in executing search warrant because, "[t]hanks to

the long memory of computers, any evidence of a crime was almost

certainly still on his computer, even if he had tried to delete

the images").

Indeed, we have previously rejected staleness claims in

similar cases that involved more than nine months of delay. See,

e.g., Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d at 119 (rejecting defendant's

staleness argument when more than three years had elapsed between

his downloads of child pornography materials to his computer and

the warrant application). Thus, we see no error in the district

court's conclusion that there was a fair probability that digital

evidence related to the requested files would remain on Daigle's

computer nine months after the download requests on Freenet.3

3 Because we determine that there was probable cause to support the search warrant, we do not address Daigle's argument challenging the district court's alternative ruling denying his motion to suppress based on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See McLellan, 792 F.3d at 207 n.4 ("Because we

- 23 -  IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we affirm the district court's

ruling denying Daigle's motion to suppress.

agree with the district court on the merits, we do not review [its] alternate holding [that the FBI acted in good faith].").

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