United States v. Aryeetey

25-499-cr United States v. Aryeetey

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ___________

August Term 2025 Argued: February 6, 2026 Decided: March 3, 2026

No. 25-499-cr ___________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

IVANJOEL ARYEETEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 1:23-cr-561-1, John P. Cronan, Judge. ___________

Before: CABRANES, NARDINI, and KAHN, Circuit Judges. ________________

1  Defendant-Appellant Ivanjoel Aryeetey appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (John P. Cronan, J.). A jury convicted Aryeetey of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Judge Cronan sentenced Aryeetey to a below-Guidelines sentence of 78 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Aryeetey asserts: (1) that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the government to introduce DNA evidence at trial despite its missing the court’s Rule 16 disclosure deadline and (2) that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We find Aryeetey’s arguments unpersuasive and accordingly AFFIRM his conviction and sentence in all respects.

________________

WILLIAM K. STONE (Ryan T. Nees and Jacob R. Fiddelman, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.

MARTIN S. BELL (Andrew W. Marrero, on the brief), Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

________________

Maria Araújo Kahn, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Ivanjoel Aryeetey appeals from a judgment of

conviction and sentence entered in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (John P. Cronan, J.). A jury convicted Aryeetey of

being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Judge

2 Cronan sentenced Aryeetey to a below-Guidelines sentence of 78 months’

imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal Aryeetey

asserts: (1) that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the

government to introduce DNA evidence despite its missing the court’s Rule 16

expert disclosure deadline, and (2) that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

We find Aryeetey’s arguments unpersuasive and accordingly AFFIRM his

conviction and sentence in all respects.

BACKGROUND

I. OFFENSE CONDUCT

In the late afternoon of September 5, 2023, Aryeetey was driving on

Washington Avenue in the Bronx. He was accompanied by a friend who was

sitting in the front passenger seat. NYPD officers observed Aryeetey driving

without a seatbelt and attempted to pull him over. Aryeetey, who was serving a

term of federal supervised release at that time, sped away until, about two minutes

later, he crashed into a parked car. Upon crashing, Aryeetey climbed out of the

car’s window and fled on foot. While fleeing, two bystanders saw Aryeetey throw

a dark green bag over a fence into a construction lot. The construction lot was

located across the street from a school. After tossing the bag, Aryeetey briefly hid

3 in a nearby auto-body shop. Once discovered by the shop owner, he jumped over

a fence and ran away.

Following the pursuit, NYPD officers recovered the bag, which contained a

loaded 9-millimeter Taurus firearm with a defaced serial number, from the

construction lot. They also searched the car and found Aryeetey’s photo ID and

cell phone. That same day, an NYPD evidence collection technician swabbed the

firearm for DNA.

Aryeetey was arrested on October 5, 2023, after reporting for a scheduled

visit with probation. On October 31, 2023, a grand jury returned an indictment

against Aryeetey, charging him with one count of possession of a firearm after a

felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

II. RULE 16 EXPERT DISCLOSURE

On June 17, 2024, the district court entered a pretrial scheduling order,

setting October 28, 2024, as the trial date, and setting August 16, 2024, as the

“deadline for the Government’s expert disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 16(a)(1)(G).” App’x 17. On September 13, 2024, four weeks after

the expert disclosure deadline, the government, pursuant to a search warrant,

collected Aryeetey’s DNA and sent it to the New York City Office of the Chief

4 Medical Examiner (“OCME”) for testing. Before the OCME completed testing, on

October 7, 2024, Aryeetey filed a motion in limine seeking to admit the anticipated

DNA results arguing that “evidence of another person’s DNA on the firearm”

would undermine the government’s case. Mot. in Lim., United States v. Aryeetey,

23-cr-00561-JPC (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2024), ECF No. 55, at 2.

The government received the OCME report on October 17, 2024, two months

after the court’s expert disclosure deadline, and provided the report to the defense

that same day. The report stated, among other things, that a DNA sample from

the gun contained a mixture of DNA from four sources that was roughly “3.48

billion . . . times more probable” to have come from “Aryeetey and three unknown

persons” than “four unknown persons.” App’x 1038. The day after receiving the

report Aryeetey moved to exclude the evidence. On October 21, 2024, seven days

before trial, the government opposed Aryeetey’s motion and provided formal

written notice of its proffered expert testimony.

At a pretrial conference on October 23, 2024, the district court denied

Aryeetey’s motion to exclude. The court found that the government was negligent

in meeting the disclosure deadline and had failed to explain why it “waited until

after [the court’s] expert disclosure deadline to even begin the DNA testing.”

5 App’x 82. However, the court found that Aryeetey was not substantially

prejudiced because he “was on notice of the pending DNA analysis for six weeks”

and had previously moved in limine to admit the evidence. Id. at 83. Nonetheless,

to remedy the government’s late disclosure, the court offered Aryeetey a

continuance of 21 days or 42 days, or to “find other possible dates” if necessary.

App’x 79. Aryeetey declined and instead asked only for a one-day continuance,

which the court granted.

III. TRIAL AND SENTENCING

Trial commenced on October 29, 2024. In his defense, Aryeetey attempted

to establish that the green bag belonged to the passenger of the car and that he did

not know it contained a gun when he fled. On November 6, 2024, the jury found

Aryeetey guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Without objection from

the parties, the court found that the applicable Guidelines range of imprisonment

was 110 to 137 months. The court sentenced Aryeetey to 78 months’

imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release, and imposed a

$100 mandatory special assessment. This appeal followed.

6  DISCUSSION

I. RULE 16 VIOLATION

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) requires the government to

disclose “to the defendant, in writing . . . any testimony that the government

intends to use at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” Fed. R.

Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(i). The Rule also requires the court to “set a time for the

government to make its disclosures,” which “must be sufficiently before trial to

provide a fair opportunity for the defendant to meet the government's evidence.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(ii). This latter provision was added in 2022 to “ensure

enforceable deadlines that the prior provisions lacked.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(a)(1)(G)(ii) advisory committee’s note to 2022 amendment. Aryeetey contends

that the 2022 amendment emphasizes the necessity of timely pretrial disclosures

and that, in light of the rule change and the circumstances of this case, any remedy

short of exclusion of the DNA evidence represents an abuse of discretion.

We are unpersuaded that the 2022 amendment to Rule 16 in any way curtails

the district court’s discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy for noncompliance

with discovery orders. The new deadlines do not set a rigid timeframe for parties

to make expert disclosures. Rather, Rule 16(a)(1)(G)(ii) and 16(b)(1)(C)(ii) impose

7 a reciprocal requirement on both the government and the defense to make expert

disclosures “sufficiently before trial to provide a fair opportunity” for each party

to meet the adversary’s evidence. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(ii); Fed. R. Crim.

P. 16(b)(1)(C)(ii). The advisory committee notes make clear that “the amendment

does not itself set a specific time for the disclosures,” but rather “allows courts to

tailor disclosure deadlines to local conditions or specific cases.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

16 advisory committee’s note to 2022 amendment. If district courts have discretion

to set deadlines, surely they retain discretion to modify them and to fashion a

remedy for Rule 16 violations. Indeed, the advisory committee notes expressly

state that district courts “retain[] discretion under Rule 16(d) . . . to alter deadlines

to ensure adequate trial preparation.” Id.

Moreover, Rule 16(d), which was unchanged by the 2022 amendment, vests

district courts with broad remedial discretion. It provides that a court may order

a noncompliant party to permit discovery, “grant a continuance,” “prohibit [a

noncompliant] party from introducing the undisclosed evidence,” or “enter any

other order that is just under the circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). We

have consistently reiterated, pursuant to Rule 16(d)(2), that “[w]hen the

government has failed to comply with Rule 16, the district court has broad

8 discretion to determine what remedial action, if any, is appropriate.” United States

v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 681 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2)); see also

United States v. Walker, 974 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]hen the government

violates Rule 16, the district court has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy,

including by granting the defense a continuance.” (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted)). That the court must now “set a time for the government to make

its disclosures,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(ii), does not limit the court’s remedial

discretion pursuant to Rule 16(d), and certainly does not indicate that untimely

disclosures must always, or even usually, result in exclusion. Preclusion remains

“a drastic remedy and is not warranted where . . . the nondisclosure was not a

product of bad faith.” United States v. Wynder, 147 F.4th 200, 215 (2d Cir. 2025).

Accordingly, we reject Aryeetey’s suggestion that exclusion is warranted here in

light of the addition of Rule 16(a)(1)(G)(ii). Cf. United States v. Eby, No. 24-3716,

2025 WL 3688925, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025) (finding no abuse of discretion in

admitting belatedly disclosed trial exhibits where the defendant “failed to

establish prejudice”).

We further hold that the district court operated well within its discretion in

admitting the DNA evidence subject to a continuance. Neither party disputes that

9 the district court correctly found that the government acted negligently, but

without bad faith in failing to meet the court’s disclosure deadline. Additionally,

the untimely disclosure did not substantially prejudice Aryeetey’s defense

because, as the district court found, he “was on notice of the pending DNA

analysis for six weeks” and was thus aware that “the government would seek to

introduce the results at trial if they were favorable to the prosecution.” App’x 83–

84. Given the lack of bad faith and undue surprise, a continuance was more than

adequate to remedy the government’s late disclosure. See, e.g., United States v.

Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 74 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming that “the district court fashioned a

satisfactory remedy by granting [the defendant] a six-day continuance” where the

government disclosed during trial its intent to elicit expert testimony); Miller, 116

F.3d at 681 (finding no abuse of discretion for admitting document the government

disclosed “shortly before calling its final direct-case witnesses” in part because the

court indicated that it “would entertain a request for a continuance if needed”);

United States v. Canada, 858 F. App’x 436, 439 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order)

(finding no abuse of discretion for admitting expert testimony disclosed “the night

before the last day of trial” because there was “no bad faith as the government

10 notified the defense as soon as it became aware that [the defendant]’s cell site

records might still be available”).

Aryeetey claims that a continuance was ineffective and that it placed him

between the proverbial rock and hard place: he could either go to trial on schedule

and unprepared, or alternatively, accept a continuance and give the government

extra time to prepare while he languished in the Metropolitan Detention Center.

His position is not unreasonable. Rule 16’s discovery obligations are “intended to

minimize surprise” and “reduce the need for continuances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16

advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. The government’s dilatory

disclosure frustrated that purpose. Although the government explained that its

delay was because the parties were engaged in discussions that would have

resulted in a pre-trial resolution, 1 it offered no explanation for failing to seek a brief

extension of the court’s disclosure deadline as that deadline approached. To be

clear, the government may not ignore court orders even if it believes it has a good

reason for its delay. When the government or defense fail to heed the discovery

1 See Oral Arg. Audio Recording at 17:15–20:05 (explaining that the government was attempting to negotiate a plea, and that in such situations, the government does not always expend the resources to conduct DNA testing, but acknowledging that the government should have requested a continuance before the deadline lapsed).

11 deadlines, as here, the district court retains discretion to remedy manifest

discovery misconduct as “is just under the circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

16(d)(2).

However, the prejudice Aryeetey points to on appeal—his prolonged

detention at the MDC and the additional preparation time for the government—

are insufficient to merit reversal. “Reversal is warranted only where the

nondisclosure ‘results in substantial prejudice to the defendant.’” See Wynder, 147

F.4th at 215 (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 912 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1990)).

“Substantial prejudice” in this context “means more than that the [evidence] was

damaging to the defendant: the defendant must demonstrate that the untimely

disclosure of the [evidence] adversely affected some aspect of his trial strategy.”

United States v. Lee, 834 F.3d 145, 158 (2d Cir. 2016) (alterations adopted and

internal quotation marks omitted). The delayed disclosure did not impair

Aryeetey’s trial strategy. Aryeetey fails to argue, either here or below, that he had

insufficient time to meet the government’s belated evidence; indeed, that he

requested only a one-day continuance cuts against any such argument. App’x 118

(“[W]e believe that we are going to be able to effectively address the issue and the

DNA witness in a relatively short space of time . . . .”). Absent such a showing, we

12 affirm. Compare Walker, 974 F.3d at 198, 204 (finding no substantial prejudice where

government disclosed incriminating fingerprint evidence “just days before trial

was scheduled to begin” in part because the court offered the defendant “a lengthy

continuance” which the defendant “declined” and rejecting the argument “that a

continuance was an insufficient remedy because it would have interfered with [the

defendant’s] liberty interest[s]”) with United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 115–16

(2d Cir. 2017) (finding substantial prejudice where the opponent was “due to rest

the following day” and had “no time to prepare to respond to the experts” and

where “a continuance might have caused the court to lose” two jurors), overruled

on other grounds by Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018).

II. SENTENCING

Aryeetey also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his below-

Guidelines sentence of 78 months’ imprisonment, arguing that it shocks the

conscience because the evidence showed only that he “knowingly possessed the

gun for a couple of minutes before tossing the bag into a vacant construction yard.”

Appellant Br. 22.

“Our review of a sentence for substantive reasonableness is particularly

deferential, and we will set aside only those sentences that are so shockingly high,

13 shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law that allowing them

to stand would damage the administration of justice.” United States v. Muzio, 966

F.3d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks

omitted). “The particular weight to be afforded aggravating and mitigating factors

is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” United

States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in

exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the

range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.

2008) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Aryeetey’s below-Guidelines sentence falls comfortably within the

permissible range. As the district court correctly observed, “the conduct here was

serious and dangerous.” App’x 990. While serving a term of supervised release,

Aryeetey fled from the police in a busy area during rush hour, putting “[a]nyone

in the area . . . at risk of serious injury, if not death, from his reckless actions.” Id.

at 991. After crashing into a parked car, he proceeded to throw a “loaded firearm

with a defaced serial number,” id., into a construction lot located “across from a

school,” id. at 973. The seriousness of this conduct was “all the more troubling

14 because it was not the first time Mr. Aryeetey unlawfully possessed a firearm,” id.

at 993, “further reflect[ing] an ongoing need for deterrence to protect the public

and instill in him respect for the law,” id. at 998. These factors readily “bear the

weight assigned [to them by the district court] under the totality of [the]

circumstances.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191.

The duration of Aryeetey’s illegal possession does not change this analysis.

The district court considered this argument, App’x 991–93, before imposing

Aryeetey’s below-Guidelines sentence. See, e.g., id. at 993 (“[The] brief period of

possession by Mr. Aryeetey do[es] inform the seriousness of the offense and the

need for just punishment.”). But see id. at 991 (“I do easily find, at a minimum, that

Mr. Aryeetey learned of the gun while in the car, took possession of the gun

knowingly, and attempted to flee from the police in possession of the gun.”).

However, Aryeetey’s “disagreement with the district court’s weighing of [the

Section 3553(a)] factors alone does not render his sentence substantively

unreasonable.” United States v. Rivera, 115 F.4th 141, 153 (2d Cir. 2024). Instead,

considering all the reasons set forth by the district court, and with due deference

to its decision, we conclude that Aryeetey’s sentence is within the “overwhelming

majority of cases” where a Guidelines sentence “fall[s] comfortably within the

15 broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular

circumstances.” United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2013); see also United

States v. Perez-Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is . . . difficult to find that a

below-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable.”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

16