State v. Edwards

#30448-a-SRJ 2024 S.D. 62

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

WANDA L. EDWARDS, Defendant and Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT MEADE COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE HONORABLE JOHN FITZGERALD Judge

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CONOR DUFFY of Duffy Law Firm Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and appellant.

MARTY J. JACKLEY Attorney General

ERIN E. HANDKE Assistant Attorney General Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.

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CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS APRIL 23, 2024 OPINION FILED 10/16/24 #30448

JENSEN, Chief Justice

[¶1.] A Sturgis police officer initiated a traffic stop after observing a vehicle

being driven without an illuminated headlamp. The driver was arrested after law

enforcement found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on his person.

Wanda Edwards, a passenger, was then asked to step out of the vehicle so they

could conduct a search of the vehicle and its contents. Edwards refused to turn over

her purse that was with her inside the vehicle. Law enforcement forcibly took

Edwards’ purse, searched it, and found a small amount of methamphetamine and

drug paraphernalia. Edwards moved to suppress the contraband found in her

purse. Edwards’ motion was denied, and she was found guilty of possession of a

controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and obstructing a law enforcement

officer. Edwards appeals the denial of her suppression motion. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

[¶2.] On November 4, 2022, Sergeant Jameson Tebben of the Sturgis Police

Department was on patrol in Sturgis. At approximately 7:46 p.m., Sergeant Tebben

observed a sedan traveling eastbound on Lazelle Street with a headlamp that was

not illuminated and initiated a traffic stop.

[¶3.] The driver of the vehicle informed Sergeant Tebben that he did not

have his driver’s license with him. The front seat passenger was able to provide her

driver’s license and identified herself as Wanda Edwards. Edwards indicated that

she was the owner of the vehicle and provided Sergeant Tebben with her vehicle

registration. She was unable to provide proof of insurance.

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[¶4.] Sergeant Tebben brought the driver to his patrol vehicle for further

questioning. The driver identified himself as Alexander Pearman but was unable to

provide his address or social security number. During their conversation, Sergeant

Tebben detected the odor of alcohol on the driver and performed a field sobriety test.

After conducting the field sobriety test, Sergeant Tebben placed the driver inside of

his patrol vehicle and returned to Edwards who was still sitting inside her vehicle.

He asked Edwards what the driver’s name was, and she informed him that the

driver’s name was “Marcus G.” The driver, however, continued to state that his

name was Alexander.

[¶5.] Because Sergeant Tebben was unable to confirm the driver’s identity,

he asked the driver to step out of the patrol vehicle and placed him in handcuffs. As

the driver was placing his hands behind his back, he plunged his left hand into his

front left pocket, which prompted Sergeant Tebben to conduct a pat down search of

the driver. Sergeant Tebben discovered an orange hypodermic needle cap, two

hypodermic needles, and a jewelry bag with a white crystal-like residue on the

driver’s person. The needles and jewelry bag contained substances that

presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine. As a result, the driver was

placed under arrest for false impersonation, possession of a controlled substance,

and drug paraphernalia.

[¶6.] By this time, Meade County Deputy Sheriff Nicolis Forbes and Sturgis

Police Officer Richard St. Peter arrived on the scene to assist. Sergeant Tebben

informed the officers that Edwards was still inside the vehicle and asked the

officers to perform a preliminary breath test (PBT) on Edwards to determine if she

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was able to drive home. He also asked the officers to conduct a search of Edwards’

vehicle.

[¶7.] Deputy Forbes approached Edwards and asked her to step out of the

vehicle. At this time, Edwards was still seated in the passenger seat with her purse

on her lap. As Edwards exited the vehicle, she took her purse from her lap and

placed it over her shoulder. Officer St. Peter instructed Edwards to turn her purse

over to Deputy Forbes. Edwards declined and stated, “I’m going to hold onto my

purse.” Deputy Forbes informed Edwards that he was “going to take [the purse]

and search it.” Edwards responded that Deputy Forbes needed a warrant to search

the purse.

[¶8.] Officer St. Peter attempted to take the purse from Edwards, but she

resisted. Edwards repeatedly claimed that the officers needed a warrant to search

her purse and requested to speak with Sergeant Tebben. Sergeant Tebben

confirmed that they were going to search the vehicle and Edwards’ purse. Edwards

continued to hold onto her purse despite being placed under arrest. Deputy Forbes

was eventually able to forcibly remove the purse from Edwards and placed her into

a patrol vehicle.

[¶9.] Deputy Forbes conducted a search of Edwards’ purse and found two

hypodermic needles, a small mirror with a white crystalline substance on it, and a

bullet-shaped keychain that contained a marijuana cigarette. The needle and

powder presumptively tested positive for methamphetamine.

[¶10.] Edwards was arrested and later indicted for possession of a controlled

substance; possession of marijuana, two ounces or less; obstructing a law

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enforcement officer; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The State also filed a

part II habitual offender information alleging that Edwards had been convicted of a

prior felony.

[¶11.] Edwards moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop,

arguing that law enforcement lacked probable cause to search her purse. At the

suppression hearing, the court heard testimony from Sergeant Tebben, Deputy

Forbes, and Officer St. Peter, and received recordings from the officers’ body

cameras.

[¶12.] The court denied Edwards’ motion to suppress, reasoning that law

enforcement was authorized to search the vehicle and its contents incident to the

driver’s arrest. Upon the arrest of the driver, the court concluded that law

enforcement could search any container inside the vehicle and Edwards’ attempt to

remove her purse from the vehicle did not defeat the fact that it was a container

inside the vehicle at the time of the arrest.

[¶13.] Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charge for possession of

marijuana and the part II information. At a bench trial, Edwards was found guilty

of possession of a controlled substance, obstructing a law enforcement officer, and

possession of drug paraphernalia. Edwards appeals her convictions arguing that

her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches was violated when law

enforcement conducted a warrantless search of her purse.

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Standard of Review

[¶14.] “Our standard of review for suppression motions is well established.”

State v. Rosa, 2022 S.D. 76, ¶ 12, 983 N.W.2d 562, 566 (quoting State v. Mousseaux,

2020 S.D. 35, ¶ 10, 945 N.W.2d 548, 551). “We review the denial of a motion to

suppress based on the alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right as a

question of law by applying the de novo standard of review.” Id. (quoting State v.

Rolfe, 2018 S.D. 86, ¶ 10, 921 N.W.2d 706, 709). “[A]s a general matter[,]

determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de

novo on appeal.” Id. (quoting State v. Wilson, 2004 S.D. 33, ¶ 8, 678 N.W.2d 176,

180). However, “[w]e review any underlying factual findings of the circuit court

‘under the clearly erroneous standard.’” State v. Red Cloud, 2022 S.D. 17, ¶ 21, 972

N.W.2d 517, 525–26 (quoting State v. Doap Deng Chuol, 2014 S.D. 33, ¶ 19, 849

N.W.2d 255, 261).

Analysis and Decision

[¶15.] Edwards concedes that law enforcement was authorized to search her

vehicle after they found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on the driver’s

person. However, she cites United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L.

Ed. 210 (1948), and argues that “probable cause to search a vehicle does not extend

to the person of a passenger inside that vehicle.” She highlights that Officer St.

Peter acknowledged that he and the responding officers did not have any probable

cause to believe that Edwards was in possession of illegal contraband at the time

her purse was searched. Edwards attempts to distinguish this Court’s decision in

State v. Steele, 2000 S.D. 78, 613 N.W.2d 825, and the United States Supreme

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Court’s decision in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed.

2d 408 (1999), by asserting that her purse was intimately connected to her person

because she held it on her lap or over her shoulder at all times during her encounter

with law enforcement. Based on this fact, she asserts that her purse “is more

analogous to a pocket attached [to her] outer clothing than a container resting

elsewhere in the vehicle.” 1

[¶16.] The State argues that law enforcement was authorized to search

Edwards’ vehicle both as a search incident to a lawful arrest and because there was

probable cause to believe that criminal activity was present inside the vehicle based

upon the drug residue and paraphernalia found on the driver’s person. The State

relies on Steele, 2000 S.D. 78, ¶ 5, 613 N.W.2d at 826, which held that when an

officer lawfully arrests an occupant of a vehicle, the officer may “as a

contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that

automobile,” including “the contents of any containers found within the passenger

compartment[.]”

[¶17.] The State, citing Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302, 119 S. Ct. at 1301, also

argues that once probable cause exists to search a motor vehicle for contraband, law

enforcement is authorized to search the vehicle and its contents, including the

personal belongings of the driver and passenger. From the State’s perspective,

allowing “a passenger to remove a container from the vehicle and claim it is part of

1. Edwards cites decisions from other state courts concluding that a purse physically attached to an individual is entitled to an increased expectation of privacy, much like outer clothing. See Idaho v. Newsom, 979 P.2d 100 (Idaho 1998); Iowa v. Campbell, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017); Kansas v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419 (Kan. 2003).

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their person, defeats the purpose of warrantless searches” because it would create

an unworkable standard for law enforcement to determine what is searchable,

leading to extensive litigation and suppression motions. The State contends that

the cases from other jurisdictions relied upon by Edwards are inapposite to the

current case because they involve instances where officers lacked probable cause to

search the vehicle or confiscated a passenger’s purse before they had probable cause

to search the vehicle in which it was found. See Kansas v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419, 427

(Kan. 2003) (distinguishing Houghton); Iowa v. Campbell, 908 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2017) (same).

[¶18.] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article

VI, § 11 of our State Constitution protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures.” 2 Thus, “warrantless searches are unreasonable and therefore

unconstitutional unless the search falls into one of the limited exceptions.” Steele,

2000 S.D. 78, ¶ 5, 613 N.W.2d at 826 (citing State v. Meyer, 1998 S.D. 122, ¶¶ 21–

27, 587 N.W.2d 719, 723–24).

[¶19.] The United States Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the

warrant requirement where ‘“contraband goods concealed and illegally transported

in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant’ where

probable cause exists.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300, 119 S. Ct. at 1301 (quotation

2. Edwards challenges the search of her purse under the South Dakota Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, but does not argue that Art. VI, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution provides greater protection than afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

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omitted). “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it

justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the

object of the search.” U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.

Ed. 2d 572 (1982). Thus, when a police officer has probable cause to search a

vehicle, they “may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable

of concealing the object of the search.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307, 119 S. Ct. at

1304. However, probable cause to search a vehicle and its containers does “not

justify a body search of a passenger.” Id. at 303, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (citing Di Re,

332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222).

[¶20.] Edwards does not challenge the determination that once law

enforcement found contraband on the driver’s person, they also had probable cause

to search the vehicle and its containers. Edwards’ sole contention is that her purse

was intimately connected to her person and not subject to search.

[¶21.] In Houghton, the driver of a vehicle was arrested after he admitted

that a hypodermic needle found in his pocket was used to inject methamphetamine.

Id. at 298, 119 S. Ct. at 1300. The defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, was

removed to conduct a search of the vehicle. Id. Law enforcement searched the

defendant’s purse discovered inside the vehicle and found drug paraphernalia inside

the purse. Id. Houghton concluded that the search of the passenger’s purse was

constitutional and “that such a package may be searched, whether or not its owner

is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it may contain the contraband that

the officer has reason to believe is in the car.” Id. at 307, 119 S. Ct. at 1304.

Relying on Ross, the Court stated, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a

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lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its

contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Id. at 301, 119 S. Ct. at 1301

(quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2173) (emphasis added). Further, “our

later cases describing Ross have characterized it as applying broadly to all

containers within a car, without qualification as to ownership.” Id.

[¶22.] Houghton also reasoned that “[p]assengers, no less than drivers,

possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they

transport in cars, which ‘trave[l] public throughfares,’ ‘seldom serv[e] as . . . the

repository of personals effects,’ are subjected to police stop and examination to

enforce ‘pervasive’ government controls ‘[a]s an everyday occurrence,’ and, finally,

are exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open to public

scrutiny.” Id. at 303, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (alterations in original) (internal citations

and quotations omitted). In addition, the Court stated that during a traffic stop, a

passenger’s privacy interests are “considerably diminished, [whereas] the

governmental interests at stake are substantial. Effective law enforcement would

be appreciably impaired without the ability to search a passenger’s belongings . . .

[because a] criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passengers’ belongings as

readily as in other containers in the car[.]” Id. at 304, 119 S. Ct. at 1302 (citations

omitted). 3 “A passenger’s personal belongings, just like the driver’s belongings or

3. In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer wrote that “[p]urses are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal items that people generally like to keep with them at all times.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 308, 119 S. Ct. at 1304 (Breyer, J., concurring). Based on this special relationship, Justice Breyer was “tempted to say that . . . if a woman’s purse, like a man’s billfold, were attached to her person . . .” that it “might then amount to a kind (continued . . .) -9- #30448

containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are ‘in’ the car, and the

officer has probable cause to search for contraband in the car.” Id. at 302, 119 S. Ct.

at 1301 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, 102 S. Ct. at 2173).

[¶23.] The State also cites Steele as an alternative basis to authorize the

search of the vehicle and Edwards’ purse, as a search incident to arrest. It is

unnecessary to consider Steele to justify the search of the vehicle because there is no

dispute that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle in this instance. 4

However, Steele is instructive on the issue before us, that being the specific

________________________ (. . . continued) of ‘outer clothing,’ which under the Court’s cases would properly receive increased protection.” Id. (citation omitted). However, the United States Supreme Court has never adopted Justice Breyer’s view, and this Court has rejected such a view, because it would blur the bright-line rule regarding searches of passenger’s belongings and ignores the reality that passengers are often involved in the same activity as the driver and can easily hide incriminating evidence in their personal belongings that are on or near their person. See Steele, 2000 S.D. 78, ¶¶ 11–18, 613 N.W.2d at 828–30.

4. The defendant in Steele was arrested on a probation violation and law enforcement subsequently searched the vehicle incident to the arrest. Like the case before us, the defendant passenger in Steele only challenged the search of her purse. She did not challenge the search of vehicle as a valid search incident to arrest. This reflected the widely accepted view, at the time, from New York v. Belton that an arrest automatically authorized a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest to include “any object capable of holding another object,” as well as “boxes, bags, clothing, and the like.” Id. ¶ 6, 613 N.W.2d at 827 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 n.4, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 n.4, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)). But in 2009, the United States Supreme Court clarified the Belton rule in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009). The Supreme Court held “that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.” Id. Instead, Gant held that the “circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Id. at 343, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citation omitted).

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authority to search Edwards’ purse in connection with an otherwise valid

warrantless search.

[¶24.] On this question, Steele, like Houghton, correctly balanced the privacy

claims associated with a person’s purse with the need for a bright-line rule in cases

where a warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment is authorized.

Requiring officers to determine whether a purse is sufficiently attached to an

individual so that it is deserving of a heightened expectation of privacy would blur

an established bright-line rule and would lead to the “seemingly inconsistent

rulings caused by fact-driven analys[es]” that Belton and Houghton sought to

eliminate. Id. ¶ 7, 613 N.W.2d at 827 (citation omitted). See Belton, 453 U.S. at

460, 101 S. Ct. at 2864.

[¶25.] The heightened interests of law enforcement to search a vehicle and its

contents, based upon probable cause that contraband is in the vehicle, outweigh

Edwards’ diminished expectation of privacy in her personal belongings that she

brought into the vehicle. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303, 119 S. Ct. at 1302

(“Passengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with

regard to the property that they transport in cars[.]”). For these reasons, Edwards’

purse was not entitled to a heightened expectation of privacy and was subject to the

same search conditions as any other container found inside of the vehicle that was

capable of concealing contraband.

[¶26.] We affirm.

[¶27.] KERN, SALTER, and DEVANEY, Justices, concur.

[¶28.] MYREN, Justice, dissents.

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MYREN, Justice (dissenting).

[¶29.] I agree that law enforcement was entitled to search the vehicle, given

the drugs found on Pearman. Although the scope of a vehicle search includes

passengers’ belongings found in the car, it does “not justify a body search of a

passenger.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.

Ed. 2d 408 (1999) (citing U.S. v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222, 92 L. Ed. 210

(1948) (emphasis added)).

[¶30.] In Houghton, the passenger’s purse was found on the backseat of the

vehicle. 526 U.S. at 298, 119 S. Ct. at 1299. In contrast, Edwards had her purse on

her lap when the car was stopped. Edwards kept the purse in her possession at all

times. When asked to exit the vehicle, she took it from her lap and put it on her

shoulder. When law enforcement told her they were going to search her purse, she

denied consent and asserted they were not authorized to search the purse without a

warrant. Law enforcement articulated no reason to believe her purse contained

illegal drugs other than the fact that she was in the same car that Pearman had

occupied. The majority opinion notes the “reality” that passengers are often

involved in the same activity as the driver. In response, I note the reality that

passengers are often NOT involved in the same activity as the driver.

[¶31.] I fully understand that it would be more convenient for law

enforcement if they are allowed to search everything whenever they stop a vehicle.

However, the convenience of law enforcement should not eliminate Edwards’ right

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth

Amendment. What makes this search unreasonable is that law enforcement had no

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probable cause to believe Edwards was engaged in criminal activity. Because she

always maintained possession of her purse, this is not a circumstance where a

“criminal might be able to hide contraband in a passenger’s belongings as readily as

in other containers in the car.” Id. at 296, 119 S. Ct. at 1299 (citing Rawlings v.

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 102, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980)).

[¶32.] My view is consistent with Justice Breyer’s approach in Houghton.

“Purses are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal items

that people generally like to keep with them at all times.” Id. at 308, 119 S. Ct. at

1304 (Breyer, J., concurring). Edwards clearly viewed her purse in that way, as

evidenced by the fact that she always kept it in her possession. Because law

enforcement was not allowed to search her person and she always maintained direct

control and possession of her purse, I would hold that law enforcement was not

authorized to search her purse. For these reasons, I dissent.

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