State of Iowa v. Patrick Scullark

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 23–1218

Submitted February 17, 2025—Filed June 20, 2025

State of Iowa,

Appellee,

vs.

Patrick Wayman Scullark, Jr.,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M.

Fangman, judge.

The State seeks further review of the court of appeals decision reversing

the district court order denying suppression of evidence found in the defendant’s

fanny pack during a search incident to arrest. Decision of Court of Appeals

Vacated; District Court Judgment Affirmed.

Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices joined

except McDermott, J., who filed a dissenting opinion.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin (argued),

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy Hau (argued) and Thomas J.

Ogden (until withdrawal), Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.  2

Oxley, Justice.

Patrick Scullark, Jr. was charged with possessing a controlled substance

after police officers searched the fanny pack that he was wearing at the time of

his arrest on unrelated charges and that he attempted to pass to another person

before being handcuffed. Scullark contends that the district court should have

suppressed the evidence of the methamphetamine found in his fanny pack,

arguing that the search violated the United States and Iowa Constitutions

because he could no longer access the fanny pack at the time it was searched.

The court of appeals agreed and reversed the district court order denying

Scullark’s motion to suppress.

Incident to a lawful arrest, police officers are authorized to conduct a full

search of the arrestee’s person. Because Scullark was wearing the fanny pack

around his waist at the time of his arrest, we conclude that this was a valid

search of his person that did not violate either the United States Constitution or

the Iowa Constitution. As explained more fully below, we vacate the court of

appeals decision and affirm the district court order denying Scullark’s motion to

suppress.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

On April 12, 2022, Officer Jacob Bolstad investigated a domestic abuse

call involving Scullark. Officer Bolstad went to the residence Scullark was known

to be at, where he found Scullark sitting on the tailgate of a truck outside.

Scullark was talking on the phone and was in an emotional, distressed state

about going back to jail. When Officer Bolstad attempted to talk with Scullark,

Scullark bolted inside the residence despite Officer Bolstad’s order to stay

outside. Officer Bolstad followed. Inside the residence, Scullark remained

agitated and emotional. He was adamant that he could not go back to jail.  3

During their encounter, Scullark was wearing a fanny pack around his

waist. Officer Bolstad told Scullark that he was going back to jail and started to

handcuff him. Scullark pulled away to remove the fanny pack from his waist,

told Officer Bolstad “don’t touch me right now,” and attempted to hand the fanny

pack and other items to one of his companions standing nearby. At this point,

Scullark was not yet handcuffed, and Officer Bolstad was the only officer on the

scene. To prevent escalating the already emotional situation, Officer Bolstad did

not oppose the handoff. After Scullark handed the items to his companion,

Officer Bolstad handcuffed Scullark behind his back and advised the companion

to set the items down because he was going to search the items and bring them

to the jail.

Other officers arrived at the scene as Officer Bolstad led Scullark out of

the residence to the patrol car. As the two walked out, Officer Bolstad picked up

the fanny pack and other items. He testified at the suppression hearing that, at

this point, Scullark was unable to access the fanny pack and its contents.

Two of Scullark’s companions followed Officer Bolstad and Scullark

outside, protesting the search of the fanny pack and its transport to the jail. They

attempted to grab the contents of the fanny pack from the officers as Officer

Bolstad conducted a pat-down search of Scullark outside the patrol car and

another officer searched the fanny pack nearby. Officer Bolstad joined the search

of Scullark’s fanny pack after placing Scullark in the back of his patrol car. The

officers found a clear baggy containing methamphetamine inside the fanny pack.

The State charged Scullark with possession of a controlled substance with

intent to deliver and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Scullark filed a motion to

suppress the contents of the fanny pack, arguing that the search violated his

rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and  4

article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. The district court found the search

of the fanny pack valid as a search incident to arrest (SITA) and denied Scullark’s

motion to suppress. In 2023, Scullark entered a conditional guilty plea to all

counts, preserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress.

Scullark challenges the denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds:

(1) the SITA exception does not apply when an arrestee is unable to access the

item at the time it is searched, and (2) the State must establish that the officers

were looking for a weapon or for evidence of the offense of arrest. We transferred

the appeal to the court of appeals, which reversed the district court’s denial of

Scullark’s motion to suppress. The court of appeals agreed with Scullark that

the search did not satisfy the SITA exception because he could not access the

fanny pack at the time it was searched.

We granted the State’s application for further review to address whether a

search of a defendant’s fanny pack that he passed to another person before being

handcuffed violates either the United States Constitution or the Iowa

Constitution. We conclude that it does not. We therefore vacate the court of

appeals decision and affirm the district court order denying Scullark’s motion to

suppress.

II. Analysis.

A. Jurisdiction to Consider the Appeal Under Iowa Code Section

814.6(3). The State challenges the court of appeals’ interpretation of Iowa Code

section 814.6(3) (2024). Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) prevents a defendant

from appealing a guilty plea to a nonclass “A” felony unless the defendant can

first establish good cause. Subsection (3) provides an exception to that rule:

A conditional guilty plea that reserves an issue for appeal shall only be entered by the court with the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or the defendant’s counsel. An appellate court shall have jurisdiction over only conditional guilty pleas that comply  5

with this section and when the appellate adjudication of the reserved issue is in the interest of justice.

Id. § 814.6(3). The court of appeals construed the requirement that the appeal

be “in the interest of justice” to mean when appellate review would be “fair and

right.” (Quoting Interests of Justice, Black’s Law Dictionary 971 (11th ed. 2019).)

Here, the State and Scullark agreed to a conditional guilty plea that

explicitly allowed Scullark to challenge the suppression ruling, and the district

court accepted the conditional guilty plea. The issue on appeal is the same issue

reserved by the conditional guilty plea, and success on appeal of that issue would

give Scullark some relief. Cf. State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 108–09

(Iowa 2021) (holding that “a legally sufficient reason is a reason that would allow

a court to provide some relief” for purposes of establishing good cause under

Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3)). Scullark satisfied section 814.6(3)’s “in the

interest of justice” requirement.

B. Unreasonable Search of the Fanny Pack. Scullark argues that

evidence from his fanny pack was obtained in violation of his right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. We review challenges to the denial of a

motion to suppress on constitutional grounds de novo. State v. Watts, 801

N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 2011) (“Because this case concerns the constitutional

right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, our review of the

district court’s suppression ruling is de novo.”). “We independently evaluate the

totality of the circumstances found in the record, including the evidence

introduced at . . . the suppression hearing . . . .” State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775,

780 (Iowa 2010). “We give deference to the district court’s findings of fact” but

are not bound by them. Id.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in

pertinent part: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,  6

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated . . . .” Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is per se

unreasonable, and therefore, unconstitutional, “subject only to a few narrow and

well-delineated exceptions.” Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 660 n.1

(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result). One such exception to the warrant

requirement is a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest. See, e.g., Chimel

v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (limiting the scope of a search incident to

a lawful custodial arrest to the arrestee’s person and the area within his

immediate control—i.e., “the area from within which [one] might gain possession

of a weapon or destructible evidence”).

Similarly, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution provides: “The right

of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against

unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated . . . .” We have

recognized similar warrant exceptions under the Iowa Constitution. See State v.

Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004) (“Exceptions recognized by this court

are searches based on consent, plain view, probable cause coupled with exigent

circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and those based on the emergency

aid exception.” (emphasis added)). While our “interpretations of section 8 have

often ‘tracked with prevailing federal interpretations’ of the Fourth Amendment,”

State v. Burns, 988 N.W.2d 352, 360 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Kain v. State, 378

N.W.2d 900, 902 (Iowa 1985)), “we are not ‘compel[led]’ to follow that path,” id.

(alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Kuble v. Bisignano, 28 N.W.2d 504,

508 (Iowa 1947)). “It follows that if a federal interpretation of the Fourth

Amendment is not consistent with the text and history of section 8, we may

conclude that the federal interpretation should not govern our interpretation of

section 8.” Id.  7

Scullark argues that the search of his fanny pack violated his

constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8

because (1) he was unable to access the fanny pack at the time the officers

searched it, and (2) the State failed to establish that the officers were looking for

a weapon or for evidence of the offense of the arrest.

In determining whether an exception to the warrant requirement applies,

we assess the officers’ conduct using an objective standard. State v. Simmons,

714 N.W.2d 264, 272 (Iowa 2006). Therefore, the officers’ subjective motivations

for conducting the search are irrelevant. Id. (“A search’s legality does not depend

on the actual motivations of the police officers involved in the search.”).

1. Determining the proper context of the search. The SITA exception has

developed in three contexts: (1) searches of the area within the arrestee’s

immediate control, (2) searches of the arrestee’s person, and (3) searches of

vehicles incident to arrest, see Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (limiting the scope of a

SITA to “the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ ”);

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235–36 (1973) (authorizing full searches

of the person incident to arrest); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009)

(deciding the appropriate scope of a search of a vehicle incident to a recent

occupant’s arrest). We must decide whether the search of the fanny pack at issue

here was a Robinson-type search of Scullark’s person or a Chimel/Gant-type

search of the area within his immediate control.

The seminal decision establishing the scope of a search of the area within

the arrestee’s immediate control is Chimel, 395 U.S. 752. In Chimel, police

officers arrested a defendant in his home pursuant to an arrest warrant. Id. at

753. The officers then searched the entirety of the defendant’s three-story home

premised only “on the basis of the lawful arrest.” Id. at 753–54. The United States  8

Supreme Court held that, incident to a lawful arrest, officers can search “the

arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that

phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon

or destructible evidence.” Id. at 763. Chimel also set out the justifications

underlying the SITA exception. A search of the person and the area within his

immediate control “serve[s] the dual purposes of protecting arresting officers and

safeguarding any evidence the arrestee may seek to conceal or destroy.” Vance,

790 N.W.2d at 786 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63).

Searches of the arrestee’s person are treated differently from a search of

the area within the arrestee’s reach. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224 (“Examination of

this Court’s decisions shows that these two propositions have been treated quite

differently.”). The Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he validity of the search of

a person incident to a lawful arrest has been regarded as settled from its first

enunciation, and has remained virtually unchallenged until the [Robinson] case.”

Id. But “[t]he validity of the second proposition, while likewise conceded in

principle, has been subject to differing interpretations as to the extent of the area

which may be searched.” Id. In Robinson, a police officer searched the arrestee’s

coat pocket and a cigarette pack he found in it incident to a lawful custodial

arrest. Id. at 221–23. The Court set out a categorical rule that officers may

conduct a full search of the arrestee’s person and the items immediately

associated with the person without regard to the justifications supporting the

SITA exception. Id. at 235–36.

[The] intrusion [of a custodial arrest] being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.  9

Id. at 235. The validity of the search does not depend on a later determination

about the likelihood that officers would have found weapons or evidence in the

specific situation. Id. Rather, by virtue of a lawful arrest, an officer is authorized

to search the arrestee’s person, his pockets, and physical items immediately

associated with him. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).

The Court expounded on the Robinson rule in Riley v. California. Id. at 386.

Riley involved the search of a cellphone incident to arrest. Id. at 378. In declining

to extend Robinson to digital data, the Court did not “overlook Robinson’s

admonition that searches of a person incident to arrest, ‘while based upon the

need to disarm and to discover evidence,’ are reasonable regardless of ‘the

probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in

fact be found.’ ” Id. at 386 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). The Court also

noted that “Robinson’s categorical rule strikes the appropriate balance in the

context of physical objects.” Id. Maintaining that categorical rule for physical

items, the Court distinguished searches of digital data found on the person: “A

conclusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no

substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may make

sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital

data has to rest on its own bottom.” Id. at 393.

Likewise, under the Iowa Constitution, we have historically recognized an

officer’s broad authority to search the arrestee’s person incident to a lawful

custodial arrest.

It is usual and proper for police officers, upon the arrest of felons to subject them to search and take from them articles found upon their persons. . . . Surely there can be no rule of law forbidding a police officer upon the arrest of one charged with a felony, from making a close and careful search of the person of the individual for stolen property, instruments used in the commission of crimes, or any article which may give a clue to the commission of crime or the  10

identification of the criminal. This too may be done promptly on arrest, and not delayed for authority from a court or a superior. The offender would speedily dispose of all such articles which would be found upon his person that might lead to the discovery of crime.

Reifsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa 101, 103 (1876). It is a well-settled rule that police

officers have inherent authority to search the arrestee’s person incident to arrest

without a warrant. State v. Kilby, 961 N.W.2d 374, 385 (Iowa 2021) (McDonald,

J., concurring specially). “[T]he greater power to arrest necessarily includes the

lesser power to search.” Id. at 386.

Indeed, we have previously adopted and applied the categorical rule from

Robinson to article I, section 8 challenges. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 974 N.W.2d

493, 496–97, 499 (Iowa 2022) (“And if an officer may lawfully arrest a person,

then the officer may perform a warrantless search incident to that arrest. The

search incident to arrest would, in turn, justify the warrantless seizure of the

contraband [found in the defendant’s pocket].” (citations omitted)); State v. Cook,

530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995) (“The full search of the arrestee’s person ‘is

not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but

is also a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.’ ” (quoting Robinson, 414

U.S. at 235)), overruled in part on other grounds by, State v. Doran, 563 N.W.2d

620 (Iowa 1997) (en banc), overruled in part by, Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113

(1998); State v. Farrell, 242 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1976) (“A search of the person

is permissible as an incident to lawful arrest, even when the offense is only a

minor moving traffic violation.”).

The federal SITA exception “trilogy” ends with Arizona v. Gant, which

determined the appropriate scope of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.

556 U.S. at 351; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 374 (“The trilogy concludes with

Arizona v. Gant . . . .” (citations omitted)). In Gant, police officers searched the  11

defendant’s vehicle after they arrested him for driving with a suspended license.

556 U.S. at 335. At the time of the search, the arrestee was handcuffed and in

the back of the patrol car. Id. The Court determined that officers may, without a

warrant, “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the

arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of

the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the

offense of arrest.” Id. at 351. This latter holding authorizing searches if “it is

reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest” is

based on “circumstances unique to the automobile context.” Id. at 335, 351.

Gant effectively overruled New York v. Belton, which had allowed police officers

to contemporaneously search the passenger compartment of an automobile and

any containers found therein incident to a lawful arrest of an occupant of the

vehicle. 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981).

After Gant, we decided State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2015). In

Gaskins, police officers searched a locked safe in the arrestee’s vehicle incident

to arrest after the arrestee was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol

car. Id. at 3. In holding the search of the safe invalid, “[w]e approve[d] Gant’s

‘reaching distance’ rationale as an appropriate limitation on the scope of

searches incident to arrest under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution

because that limitation is faithful to the underlying justifications for warrantless

searches incident to arrest.” Id. at 13.

Scullark argues that the reaching-distance rule of Gant and Gaskins

applies to the search at issue here instead of the categorical Robinson rule.

Scullark asserts that under Gant and Gaskins, the search of his fanny pack

violated both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 because he was

unable to access the fanny pack at the time it was searched. We disagree. We  12

conclude that because the fanny pack was attached to his person at the time of

the arrest, this is a search of the person, governed by Robinson—rather than a

search of the area within his immediate control, governed by Chimel, Gant, or

Gaskins.

Starting with his argument under the Fourth Amendment, Gant did not

modify the rule pertaining to searches of the arrestee’s person and the items

immediately associated with him. Robinson still governs these searches. See

People v. Cregan, 10 N.E.3d 1196, 1203 (Ill. 2014) (“Gant does not apply to a

search incident to arrest of the defendant’s person or items immediately

associated with the defendant’s person. The search in those circumstances is

still controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson.”).

The language of the majority opinion in Gant, Justice Alito’s dissent, and

the subsequent Riley opinion inform our conclusion. As Justice Alito stated in

his Gant dissent: “The first part of the Court’s new two-part rule—which permits

an arresting officer to search the area within an arrestee’s reach at the time of

the search—applies, at least for now, only to vehicle occupants and recent

occupants . . . .” 556 U.S. at 363–64 (Alito, J., dissenting). Then in Riley, the

Court took a limited view of the majority opinion in Gant by referencing it as a

case “which analyzed searches of an arrestee’s vehicle” and “authorize[d] police

to search a vehicle ‘only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching

distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.’ ” Riley, 573

U.S. at 384–85 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343). The Riley Court also noted that

“[l]ower courts applying Robinson and Chimel . . . have approved searches of a

variety of personal items carried by an arrestee.” Id. at 392.

Although other courts have extended Gant outside of the vehicle context,

see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2021) (applying Gant  13

to the search of a backpack the arrestee dropped prior to arrest); United States

v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2019) (extending Gant’s principles to

a purse near the arrestee at the time of search and limiting Robinson to searches

of clothing and containers concealed under or within the clothing); United States

v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying Gant to the search of a bag

the arrestee was holding at the time of arrest), we find more persuasive those

federal cases that have not, see, e.g., United States v. Perez, 89 F.4th 247, 256,

259 (1st Cir. 2023) (stating that “Gant did not address carried personal property

at all,” and the Robinson rule would continue to govern searches “of personal

items carried by an arrestee” (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 392)); United States v.

Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 752 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Gant elaborates upon the

circumstances in which an arrestee no longer has the possibility to reach into

the ‘passenger compartment’ of his vehicle, and the Court’s discussion of

whether the arrestee is no longer ‘unsecured and within reaching distance’ of

that area must be understood in that limited context. The Court focuses

exclusively on how the rule will affect vehicle searches . . . .” (citations omitted)

(quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343)). We therefore find that the reaching-distance

rule of Gant does not apply to searches of the arrestee’s person incident to arrest.

Robinson still governs these searches.

We reach the same conclusion under the Iowa Constitution. Like Gant,

Gaskins did not change the standard for searches of the arrestee’s person

incident to arrest. To determine the validity of a search of the arrestee’s person,

we likewise look to Robinson. See Hunt, 974 N.W.2d at 496–97, 499 (applying

Robinson to a challenge to contraband found in an arrestee’s pocket under both

the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8).  14

2. Was Scullark’s fanny pack part of his person? We still need to determine

whether the search of an arrestee’s person incident to an arrest allows a police

officer to also search a fanny pack on the arrestee’s person at the time the officer

initiates an arrest. In other words, what is included in the “person” that can be

searched incident to his arrest? As the Kentucky Supreme Court recently

explained:

[I]f the [bag] is properly considered part of [the defendant’s] “person,” then the search was lawful as no additional justification for the search other than it being incident to his arrest was needed. However, if the [bag] was instead “the area within his immediate control,” we would then need to address whether the search of the [bag] was justified based on officer safety or the preservation of evidence.

Commonwealth v. Bembury, 677 S.W.3d 385, 396–97 (Ky. 2023).

To determine the proper scope of a search of an arrestee’s person, we look

to the time of arrest. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 226 (“When an arrest is made, it

is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to

remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or

effect his escape.” (emphasis added) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. 762–63)).

Consistent with the “jealously guarded” SITA exception, the proper scope of the

time of arrest rule is narrow; “[i]t does not extend to all articles in an arrestee’s

constructive possession, but only those personal articles in the arrestee’s actual

and exclusive possession at or immediately preceding the time of arrest.” State

v. Byrd, 310 P.3d 793, 799 (Wash. 2013) (quoting State v. Ortega, 297 P.3d 57,

60 (Wash. 2013) (en banc)).

Officers are authorized to search not only the person but also those objects

which are closely related to and immediately associated with the person. Preston

v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (“This right to search and seize without

a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control . . . .”  15

(citations omitted)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

explained:

The human anatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency[,] . . . many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning.

United States v. Graham, 638 F.2d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 1981).

Because police officers necessarily must make quick ad hoc decisions

when determining how, where, and what to search, they need to know what items

they are authorized to search without triggering the need for additional

justifications. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“A police officer’s determination as

to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is

necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not

require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the

search.”). The time-of-arrest rule sets a bright-line rule that allows officers to

search the arrestee’s person and any items in the arrestee’s actual and exclusive

possession at the time of the arrest or immediately preceding it. This limited

search “constitute[s] only minor additional intrusions compared to the

substantial government authority exercised in taking [the arrestee] into

custody.” Riley, 573 U.S. at 392.

Full Robinson searches of the person ensure officer safety during “the

extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and

transporting him to the police station.” 414 U.S. at 234–35. “When police take

an arrestee into custody, they also take possession of his clothing and personal

effects, any of which could contain weapons and evidence.” Byrd, 310 P.3d at  16

798. Thus, “it is reasonable to allow for an officer to protect himself by searching

items he places in his patrol car and transports to the police station.” State v.

Allen, No. 06–1770, 2007 WL 2964316, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007); cf.

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1983) (explaining that another

governmental interest in searching any container or article found on the arrestee,

incident to incarcerating an arrestee, is to inventory personal property and

protect officers against possible false claims of theft).

Scullark relies on Gaskins, but like Gant, Gaskins involved the search of

a vehicle incident to the driver’s arrest. The locked safe that the officers searched

in Gaskins was never on or attached to the arrestee’s person. See Gaskins, 866

N.W.2d at 3–4. Here, however, the fanny pack was physically attached around

Scullark’s waist at the time Officer Bolstad initiated Scullark’s arrest by

attempting to place him in handcuffs. It was only at this point that Scullark

removed and handed the fanny pack to his companion. We believe this is

sufficient to conclude that the fanny pack was immediately associated with

Scullark. The fanny pack was an extension of his person, much like his pockets,

the search of which requires no additional justification beyond lawful arrest. See

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable

cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion

being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.”);

see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (explaining “that inspecting the contents of an

arrestee’s pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond

the arrest itself may make sense as applied to physical items” but not to digital

data); 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 276, at 512–13 (2020) (noting that

a purse is considered an extension of the person much like the person’s clothing

or pockets).  17

Because the police officers needed no additional justification to search the

fanny pack, we conclude that the State was not required to show the officers’

reasons for conducting the search. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235–36. “Since it

is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the authority to search, it is of

no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the respondent

or that he did not himself suspect that [he] was armed.” Id. at 236 (footnote

omitted). We do not inquire into the officers’ reasons for conducting the search

of the arrestee’s person because “[t]he interests justifying search are present

whenever an officer makes an arrest.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177

(2008); see also Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35 (explaining that the close contact

with suspects when making an arrest and transporting them to the jail, as

opposed to the “fleeting contact” involved with “Terry-type stop[s,] . . . is an

adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of search

justification”); Byrd, 310 P.3d at 796 (“[S]earches of the arrestee’s person and

personal effects do not require ‘a case-by-case adjudication’ because they always

implicate Chimel concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation.” (quoting

Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235)).

Therefore, a lawful custodial arrest justifies a warrantless search of the

person, as long as the search is contemporaneous with the arrest. See Vance,

790 N.W.2d at 786 (“[T]he lawful custodial arrest of a person justifies the

contemporaneous search of the person arrested and of the immediately

surrounding area . . . .”). Here, the officers searched the fanny pack while still at

the scene and within minutes of Scullark’s arrest. Officers need not expose

themselves to unnecessary danger by searching the arrestee and the items on

his person before he is properly secured. “[T]he police may see to the safe custody

and security of suspects first and then make the limited search which the  18

circumstances of the particular case permit.” State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324,

328 (Iowa 1977). “The search incident to arrest rule respects that an officer who

takes a suspect into custody faces an unpredictable and inherently dangerous

situation and that officers can and should put their safety first.” Byrd, 310 P.3d

at 797.

Scullark’s position requires extending the reasoning of Gant and Gaskins

to searches of the person. However, a reasonable search of the person should

not depend on games of “hot potato.” An arrestee cannot establish and reduce

the scope of a permissible SITA by handing the item to a companion before the

officer can search him. See State v. Rincon, 970 N.W.2d 275, 284–85 (Iowa 2022)

(holding that a woman could not prevent police officers from searching her purse

by removing it from an automobile when officers had authority to search the

automobile and its containers under the automobile exception); see also

Reifsnyder, 44 Iowa at 103 (“The offender would speedily dispose of all such

articles which would be found upon his person that might lead to the discovery

of crime.”).

We therefore conclude that because Scullark was wearing the fanny pack

around his waist at the time of arrest, the fanny pack was immediately

associated with his person for purposes of the SITA exception, and the

categorical rule from Robinson and the related Iowa precedent applies. The

search of the fanny pack was reasonable as a search of Scullark’s person, and

no additional justification for the search was required beyond Scullark’s lawful

custodial arrest. We hold that the search of Scullark’s fanny pack was a valid

SITA under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8. The district

court did not err in denying Scullark’s motion to suppress.  19

III. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated above, we vacate the court of appeals decision and

affirm the district court order denying Scullark’s motion to suppress.

Decision of Court of Appeals Vacated; District Court Judgment

Affirmed.

All justices concur except McDermott, J., who files a dissenting opinion.  20

#23–1218, State v. Scullark

McDermott, Justice (dissenting).

Under the Iowa Constitution, before an officer may search or seize

“persons, houses, papers [or] effects,” the officer must first obtain a warrant.

Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. One recognized exception to this warrant requirement,

justified by necessity, allows an officer to search a person placed under arrest

and the area within the person’s immediate control for two purposes: (1) to

ensure the officer’s safety and (2) to prevent the person from destroying evidence

of a crime for which there is probable cause. The majority concludes that the

officers’ search of Patrick Scullark, Jr.’s fanny pack was lawful under this

“search incident to arrest” exception. But because the officer’s search of the

fanny pack in this case meets neither of the two purposes for the exception, I

must respectfully dissent.

Scullark was in his backyard when Officer Jacob Bolstad arrived to

investigate an allegation of domestic violence. Bolstad’s bodycam footage shows

that as he began to talk to Scullark about the matter, Scullark got upset and

walked inside with Bolstad walking after him. Inside the house, the discussion

continued, with a couple of women also present in the room who were helping

Scullark move in. Scullark was distraught and complained to Bolstad that he

didn’t do anything, he was on parole, and the charge might mean going back to

prison. After a few minutes, Scullark calmed down, and at that point, Bolstad

told Scullark that he needed to take him to jail.

Before Bolstad put Scullark in handcuffs, Scullark handed his fanny pack

and cellphone to one of the women in the room. As Bolstad began to handcuff

Scullark, Bolstad said, “All the stuff you’re handing to her, I’m searching.” As

Bolstad continued applying the handcuffs, the woman carrying the fanny pack  21

and phone began to walk ahead of them into an adjoining room. Bolstad told the

woman, “Stay over here with that.” The woman promptly set the fanny pack and

phone down on some boxes. As Bolstad led a handcuffed Scullark toward the

door, Bolstad stopped where the woman had set down the items and picked up

the fanny pack and cellphone. Bolstad admits that, at this point, Scullark could

not have accessed the fanny pack.

Another officer who had arrived was waiting in the backyard when they

exited the house. Bolstad handed the fanny pack to the other officer to carry.

Bolstad led Scullark from the back door, around the house, and to Bolstad’s

police cruiser in front of the house. The two women from inside walked with

them. When they got to Bolstad’s cruiser, Bolstad patted Scullark down,

revealing no weapons or contraband. At this point, a third officer had arrived to

assist. Before putting Scullark in the cruiser, Bolstad gave Scullark, still

handcuffed, a moment to talk to the two women. The women had Scullark’s

mother on speakerphone, and Scullark told his mother that he was being taken

to jail. Bolstad then placed Scullark in the back of the police cruiser and closed

the door. At this point, outside the cruiser, the other officer holding the fanny

pack opened it, and he and Bolstad searched it. The fanny pack contained a

baggy of methamphetamine, for which Scullark was ultimately prosecuted for

possession.

One of the evils that the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution was designed to protect against was the abuse of suspicionless

general warrants. See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and

Original Meaning 602–1791, at 603–13 (2009) [hereinafter Cuddihy, The Fourth

Amendment]. General warrants allowed government officers to search a person

or property for evidence of wrongdoing without specifying what they were looking  22

for or why they had suspicion to search. See Sanders v. State, 2 Clarke 230, 239

(Iowa 1855). Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless the state

proves that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v.

Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004). The warrantless search of Scullark’s

fanny pack—his “effect,” meaning movable personal property—was thus

unlawful unless a recognized exception applies.

The State relies on the search-incident-to-arrest exception, which permits

an arresting officer to search the arrestee’s person and “the area into which an

arrestee might reach.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Under the

Federal Constitution, the exception allows the search where it ensures officer

safety, prevents evidence from being destroyed, and in the context of

automobiles, enables evidence collection. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.

218, 235–36 (1973); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2009). Under the

Iowa Constitution, the exception allows the search only where it ensures officer

safety and prevents evidence from being destroyed. See State v. Gaskins, 866

N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2015). Because an automobile is not involved, the question

presented here is the same under both the Federal and Iowa Constitutions:

whether once Scullark removed his fanny pack and was handcuffed, the officer-

safety or evidence-destruction rationales existed to justify the search of the fanny

pack.

Once Scullark removed the fanny pack, it was no longer part of his

“person.” And when the woman walked into the adjoining room with the fanny

pack, it was no longer within an area that Scullark could readily access. From

that moment forward, neither of the rationales supporting the search-incident-

to-arrest exception—officer safety and evidence preservation—could justify the

search of the fanny pack. When the officers eventually searched the fanny pack  23

while standing outside the police cruiser, Scullark sat handcuffed in the back

seat of the cruiser with the door shut. We do not assume that once handcuffed

and locked in a police car, an arrestee will exhibit “the skill of Houdini [or] the

strength of Hercules” to break free and gain access to a container. Thornton v.

United States, 541 U.S. 615, 626 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)

(quoting United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Scullark could not have grabbed a

weapon hidden inside, nor could he have removed any items of evidence had

there conceivably been any.

It bears mentioning that Scullark never ceded his privacy interest in the

fanny pack. The fanny pack was not in any sense abandoned, as Scullark

personally handed it to the woman inside his home. See State v. Bumpus, 459

N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa 1990) (holding that a defendant lacks standing to

challenge a search or seizure of abandoned property). And in her hands (or as it

lay on a box in his home), the fanny pack was not otherwise going to be taken to

the jail where it inevitably would have been searched as part of the booking

process. See State v. Entsminger, 160 N.W.2d 480, 483–84 (Iowa 1968) (holding

that police can search an arrestee’s effects during booking without a warrant).

“The search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement,” we

have declared, “must be narrowly construed and limited to accommodating only

those interests it was created to serve.” State v. McGrane, 733 N.W.2d 671, 677

(Iowa 2007). The warrantless search of the fanny pack in this case did nothing

to advance those interests. Because the fanny pack didn’t fall within the search-

incident-to-arrest exception, or any other exception, the police needed to get a

warrant supported by probable cause to search it. They didn’t, and the search

was thus unconstitutional. See State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa  24

2005). The district court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence

uncovered through the search of the fanny pack.

This conclusion is not groundbreaking. In State v. Canas, for instance, the

police had a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. 597 N.W.2d 488, 491

(Iowa 1999), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601

(Iowa 2001). The police arrived at the defendant’s motel, but when the defendant

saw them, he went back into his room and slammed the door. Id. When the police

knocked and the defendant answered, they pulled him out of the room to arrest

him. Id. When the officers grabbed him, the defendant had been standing about

four feet from an unzipped bag on a nightstand, arguably within his area of

immediate control. Id. After his arrest, the police went back into the motel room,

searched the bag, and found drug paraphernalia. Id. We held that the search-

incident-to-arrest exception did not apply because, at the time of the search, the

defendant was outside the motel room and thus the search did not advance

officer safety or prevent the destruction of evidence. Id. at 493.

In United States v. Davis, the defendant was being chased by police

through a swamp. 997 F.3d 191, 198 (4th Cir. 2021). As he came out of the

swamp to surrender, he took off the backpack he was wearing and laid it on the

ground. Id. The police handcuffed him and then searched his bag. Id. The United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the government

could not justify the search of the bag under the search-incident-to-arrest

exception because once the defendant was secured in handcuffs and the

backpack was not under his immediate control, there was no longer any safety

or destruction-of-evidence concerns. Id.

Similarly, in United States v. Fernández Santos, the police went to the

defendant’s house to arrest him. 716 F. Supp. 3d 8, 12 (D.P.R. 2024). When they  25

arrived, they saw the defendant throw a fanny pack (yes, another fanny pack)

out a window and into the backyard. Id. The police arrested the defendant inside

the house. Id. After about forty minutes, the police searched the fanny pack.

United States v. Fernández Santos, No. 23–063, 2023 WL 8915838, at *2 (D.P.R.

Dec. 27, 2023). The district court rejected the government’s search-incident-to-

arrest argument and suppressed the items discovered in the fanny pack,

concluding that once the defendant threw the fanny pack into the yard, the

search would not advance the officer-safety or evidence-preservation rationales.

Id. at *7–8; Fernández Santos, 716 F. Supp. 3d at 14 (adopting the magistrate’s

suppression ruling).

United States v. Knapp presents a factual scenario even more analogous to

this case. 917 F.3d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 2019). In Knapp, the defendant was

arrested after giving a witness statement to police about a grocery store theft

when officers learned that she had an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. After

making the defendant wait inside the grocery store while several officers

completed the earlier theft investigation, one of the officers eventually took

possession of the purse she had been carrying. Id. at 1163–64. The officer asked

for her consent to search the purse, but she refused. Id. at 1164. When the

defendant asked if she could simply leave the purse in her truck or give it to her

boyfriend, the officer refused. Id. at 1163. The officers placed her in handcuffs

behind her back and led her outside. Id. at 1164. As the defendant stood outside

a police cruiser, an officer threatened that she would be guilty of a felony if she

brought drugs to a detention center. Id. The defendant then told the officer that

the purse contained a pistol. Id. Three officers were present as they searched the

purse while the defendant, still handcuffed, stood with her back to them. Id. She

was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.  26

The government in Knapp argued that the search was justified under the

search-incident-to-arrest exception. Id. at 1167. Analyzing the rationales for the

exception described in Chimel v. California, the Tenth Circuit first concluded that

the purse was not part of the defendant’s “person” at the time of the search. Id.

at 1167–68. Turning next to whether it was within the area of the arrestee’s

immediate control, the court recited several facts: (1) the defendant’s hands were

cuffed behind her back, (2) the arresting officer was standing next to her with

two other officers standing nearby, (3) the purse was closed and placed three to

four feet behind her, and (4) the officers had maintained exclusive possession of

the purse since placing her in handcuffs inside the grocery store. Id. at 1169. In

light of these facts, the court held that it was unreasonable to believe she could

have gained possession of a weapon or destroyed evidence inside her purse at

the time of the search. Id. at 1168. The panel thus reversed the district court’s

denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. Id. at 1170.

In this case, the majority concludes that once an officer begins an arrest

attempt, the search-incident-to-arrest exception makes anything on or near the

person at that moment fair game to search, regardless of what happens after. But

in real life, time does not freeze, as we all know, and our analysis of risks

similarly does not remain static as events change. Grounding the search-

incident-to-arrest exception on such an artificial notion—reducing interactions

between suspects and police to what can be thought of as a series of Polaroid

pictures and justifying a later search by holding up an outdated snapshot—

untethers the exception from its rationale. Had the cases discussed above relied

on the “freeze-frame” notion of the search-incident-to-arrest exception, none

would have come out the way that they did.  27

The search-incident-to-arrest exception is based on an existing exigency—

a present threat to officer safety or a present threat of losing evidence—not a

historical one. Taken to its logical end, the majority’s theory would have

permitted the officers in this case not simply to have searched the fanny pack

five minutes after Scullark was handcuffed (as happened here), but for the

officers to hold onto the fanny pack and conduct a warrantless search a month

or even a year later, in a location miles away from Scullark.

The majority worries that a different application would make search-

incident-to-arrest decisions more complicated because it would force officers to

decide between (1) making the arrest immediately, before personal items can be

discarded, to take advantage of the warrant exception or (2) delaying the arrest

and having to go through the hassle of a search warrant. But as Justice Scalia

warned, “The weakness of this argument is that it assumes that, one way or

another, the search must take place. But conducting a Chimel search is not the

Government’s right; it is an exception—justified by necessity—to a rule that

would otherwise render the search unlawful.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 627

(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The search-incident-to-arrest exception

is based on the justification that officers need to search items that presently are

on or near the arrestee, not that officers get to search items that previously were

on or near the arrestee.

I recognize the attractiveness of a bright-line rule in these situations. Clear

rules, when they can be drawn consistent with a person’s constitutional rights,

are unquestionably worthy judicial pursuits. But this case demonstrates what

happens when we expand what is supposed to be a limited exception in favor of

easier-to-administer rules. The framers crafted our constitutional search and

seizure protections despite the potential hindrance or haziness they might pose  28

for law enforcement. “The Fourth Amendment’s framers were well aware of the

constitutional alternatives regarding search and seizure.” Cuddihy, The Fourth

Amendment at 613.

When in conflict, upholding our constitutional protections must always

prevail over the urge for simplicity in implementation. “Solving unsolved crimes

is a noble objective,” as Justice Scalia observed, “but it occupies a lower place in

the American pantheon of noble objectives than the protection of our people from

suspicionless law-enforcement searches. The Fourth Amendment must prevail.”

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 481 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

I would reverse the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress and

remand the case for further proceedings.